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Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 6 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

__President__: Mr. D.D.C. Don Nanjira (Kenya)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 705th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I should like to extend a warm welcome to His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner, who will be our first speaker today. His long experience in multilateral diplomacy is well known both as a representative of his country to the United Nations in Geneva and New York as well as his long and high-level association with the United Nations Secretariat. I am all the more happy to welcome Ambassador Wyzner as I had the privilege of serving my own country as Ambassador in Poland and I can also speak some Polish. I am sure that we are all looking forward to Ambassador Wyzner's statement with great interest.

I also have on my list of speakers the representatives of Egypt, Kazakhstan, Morocco, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Pakistan, China, India, the Russian Federation and Nigeria, and I understand that Myanmar will speak on behalf of the Group of 21.

Before giving the floor to the speakers inscribed today, please allow me to say a few words of farewell to one of our most distinguished colleagues. As you are aware, this is the last time that Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico will be among us, as he has been called to other, important duties by his Government after five years as Mexico's representative to the Conference. I do not need to dwell on the impact that, together with his delegation, he has had on this Conference. His commitment to the cause of disarmament has never wavered and is well known to all of us. This forum has benefited considerably from the depth and candour of his contributions to our work. Ambassador Marín Bosch was instrumental in bringing about the Conference's long-held objective of establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with a negotiating mandate for the first time. As Chairman of that Committee, he brought a high degree of dedication and dynamism which has provided a good foundation on which the negotiations are now proceeding. I am sure I interpret the sentiments of all of you when I say that we will miss his forthrightness, his humour and his warmth. I should like to extend to Ambassador Marín Bosch and his family all our best wishes for the future.

It now gives me great pleasure to give the floor to His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner.

Mr. WYZNER (Poland): Mr. President, I am indeed most grateful for your kind words of welcome. Dziękuję bardzo, Panie Przewodniczący (Thank you very much, Mr. President). Let me first congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. It is good to know that at this important time the CD can rely for leadership on a skilled negotiator and a distinguished representative of Kenya, a country known for its dedication to the cause of disarmament. For us it is especially satisfying to see the helm of this body in the hands of a good friend of Poland and a fluent speaker of Polish. May I also associate this delegation with the words of appreciation expressed to your distinguished predecessor, the Ambassador of Japan, Her Excellency Mrs. Hisami Kurokochi, for the competent and courteous manner in which she discharged her Presidential responsibilities last month? I would also like to associate myself with your words addressed to Ambassador Marín Bosch, with whom I had the distinguished pleasure to work in this Conference many years ago in the 1970s.

My warm greetings go also to an old friend and a former colleague, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, as well as to the Deputy Secretary-General of the CD, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail.

To strike a personal note, I am indeed delighted to be back at the CD, after years of service as Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations.

I deem it a privilege to be able to address the Conference on Disarmament at a moment in time when yet another highly productive CTBT negotiating session is coming to an end. It is also a time when our minds increasingly turn to another crucially important occasion - the NTP review and extension Conference. That its positive outcome will have important implications for the future of the Treaty, for non-proliferation and for nuclear disarmament at large, is beyond question. I am sure that its significance for the ultimate success of the CTBT negotiating process will not escape any member of this venerable body either. My country is honoured by the challenging role in that process which the Conference on Disarmament has entrusted to Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski. We are fully conscious of the demands and responsibilities which go with the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee. The Polish delegation shall spare no effort to live up to the confidence bestowed upon it.

Poland's consistent support of the NPT stems from our considered view that it is a bulwark of the non-proliferation regime which has stood the test of time and that it represents a crucial factor of global security. Like many other States parties we, therefore, consider that the Treaty deserves to be extended indefinitely and unconditionally. Failure to do so would erode the Treaty's credibility and lead to uncertainty and apprehensions about the future of non-proliferation. International security, be it global or regional, would not be more stable today if no Treaty had been concluded 25 years ago. By the same token, the world's political and security environment in the days ahead will not improve, and the globe will not become a safer place, if the Treaty fails to emerge from the review process significantly strengthened.

It is true, though regrettable, that a number of important States are still staying away from the NPT. Indeed, we urge them to reconsider their stance and accede to the Treaty as soon as possible. Thanks to the recent accessions of Ukraine, Algeria and Argentina, to mention just a few, this accord has become one of the most universally embraced international instruments. In our view, there are good security reasons underlying this near-universality of the NPT. They go far beyond NPT's intrinsic merits.

Poland has welcomed with particular satisfaction the adherence of Ukraine to the NPT as a non-nuclear State party. Notwithstanding the obvious implications of this act for stability and security in Europe, and particularly in our immediate neighbourhood, it has broader, global significance. It is generally believed, for instance, that the ratification will enable the entry into force of START I, thus paving the way for early ratification and the subsequent entry into force of START II. Recent official indications from Moscow and Washington suggest, moreover, that once START II is ratified, the United States and Russia would address the possibility of additional reductions and limitations on remaining nuclear forces.

These two unprecedented nuclear disarmament treaties manifest most eloquently that the commitments undertaken in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty are being fulfilled in good faith. They prove that the nuclear arms race, once mind-boggling, has not only ceased but has been reversed. It was, therefore, quite appropriate for the Secretary-General of the United Nations to state in his message to the Conference on Disarmament that "further progress in the reduction of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation is no longer beyond the reach of reality". In the Secretary-General's view, such progress would enable other nuclear-weapon States to move forward the process of nuclear disarmament, thus making yet another contribution to the establishment of a safer world.

The Conference on Disarmament has been focusing its attention on the question of a comprehensive test ban. Let me dwell briefly on this critically important endeavour. The opening of the multilateral negotiations on a CTBT last year testifies to the determination of the five declared nuclear States to control the nuclear genie in the face of growing threats it poses. The joint political resolve of these States to seek a comprehensive test ban as the top priority in disarmament agenda reflects their readiness to engage in a multilateral, cooperative effort to enhance the global security environment, consistent with commitments contracted under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. The Conference on Disarmament must not miss and, indeed, it is not missing the window of opportunity thus created. As the first part of the CD session comes to a close, the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban can take well-deserved credit for important headway made in its negotiating effort. While it is clear from the revised rolling text of the draft treaty that some of the fundamental and sensitive issues are yet to be agreed upon, the results obtained are positive. At least one dividend from the negotiations pursued in the CD is already there - the nuclear test sites, or almost all of them, have been inactive under standing test moratoria. Hopefully, by the time the 1995 session comes to an end, the Conference on Disarmament will have elaborated an agreed draft CTBT text that will render all such test sites inactive forever.

Early progress towards this goal will certainly call for determination, good will and flexibility on the part of all negotiating delegations. Without the necessary spirit of compromise and accommodation, it may be next to impossible to cleanse the CTBT rolling text where it is still heavily bracketed. Flexibility, good will and political resolve are especially critical when it comes to issues that are pivotal to the future treaty - the provisions on scope, duration, entry into force, verification and institutional arrangements.

Poland is on record as a consistent supporter of a good treaty, rather than a quick one. In our view, the future CTBT must be comprehensive and goal-specific. It must ban all nuclear tests, everywhere and for all time, in a manner that leaves no loopholes whatsoever. No more, no less. These criteria would certainly not be met if an omnibus accord were sought in the expectation that it could provide a cure-all remedy for all disarmament ills. We deem it neither appropriate nor possible for the treaty prohibitions to apply to activities which are not verifiable, such as computer simulations, or ones which are either vaguely defined or hypothetical. Such a ban could undermine the overall credibility and effectiveness of the treaty.

We look forward to early progress in efforts to work out agreed language on the basic obligations. In this regard the consultations pursued by the nuclear-weapon States are of special importance.

Poland firmly opts for a CTBT of indefinite duration. No short-term nuclear test ban would represent a satisfactory measure as a step to check proliferation of nuclear arms. The withdrawal by the United States of its proposal allowing a comparatively easy exit from the CTBT, in favour of the standard clause invoking "supreme interests", goes in the right direction. We welcome this example of flexibility. We hope that it will be a sustained factor to be emulated by other negotiators.

We are encouraged by the progress made in regard to the entry-into-force formula. Being flexible as to the number of ratifications necessary in order to bring the treaty into effect, Poland is of the view that the possible condition in this case could be ratification by the five nuclear States as well as those States which, according to IAEA, possess nuclear research or power reactors. Here we share the views of those States which favour an early entry into force of the treaty yet insist that care must be taken to prevent even a remote possibility of the treaty being held hostage by any one State or group of States.

We have no doubt that the international monitoring system now being elaborated will enable effective detection of non-compliance. Its technical capabilities, supplemented by procedures for prompt, mandatory on-site inspections, consultation and clarification as well as national implementation measures, will add up to an effective verification system. Cost-effectiveness of the "four-pillar" IMS regime would be an important consideration and an evident asset.

In our view, the future CTBT-implementing organization of a reasonable size, co-located with IAEA in Vienna and enjoying a functional relationship with the Agency, would best correspond to the criteria of an impartial mechanism that is operationally effective and independent, whose costs would keep the financial implications for States parties within a tolerable range. We welcome the offer of the Government of Austria to host the CTBT organization in its capital.

The momentum generated in the CTBT negotiations has created a climate conducive to the pursuit of the broader objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear arms control. The Government of Poland is gratified that this momentum has not been lost and that consensus has been reached by the Conference on Disarmament to seek a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Thus a step has been made providing conditions in which States parties to the NPT can go on, in good faith, to discharge their responsibilities under article VI of that Treaty.

We commend Ambassador Shannon of Canada, the CD Coordinator on cut-off, for his dedicated efforts in this respect. They led him to work out a mandate that has proved acceptable to all delegations. Based on United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75 L, it has enabled the Conference to establish an appropriate Ad Hoc Committee. Without in any way prejudging the outcome of negotiations before they could commence, the mandate provides a framework wherein different aspects of the cut-off issue can be addressed. In the meantime this new negotiating process will hopefully encourage self-restraint measures. The welcome precedent in this respect is the recent withdrawal by the United States of 200 tons of fissile materials from its nuclear stockpile.

Like many CD members and observers, we recognize that it is proper and legitimate for this body to focus its attention on arms control and disarmament in the nuclear field. While concentrating on this area the Conference on Disarmament must not, however, lose sight of the other agenda items it dealt with last year: transparency in armaments, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Let me recall, in this connection, that Poland has always believed it important for the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States over their security to be adequately addressed. As a non-nuclear State herself, Poland has a vested interest in urging attention to these concerns. It is, therefore, with great satisfaction that we welcome the unanimous action which the five nuclear States - the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council - are about to take. It demonstrates that they are prepared to extend security assurances to States that have forsworn a nuclear arms race under the NPT. We find this action timely and consistent with the letter and spirit of the non-proliferation Treaty.

We believe that a situation emerges in the Conference on Disarmament which should be conducive to bringing balance to its agenda. The terms of reference under which this body operates must reflect better the disarmament realities of the post-cold-war era. In our view, the CD needs to respond to the anxieties generated by the present-day threats to international security, regional conflicts in the first place. My Government believes, that however legitimate our concern over nuclear disarmament may be, nothing can justify continued failure to address conventional arms. Since the nuclear era began half a century ago, conventional arms, from aircraft, tanks, artillery and land-mines down to booby traps, machine-guns, rifles and machetes, have exacted a heavy toll. Death and suffering have been showered on millions of human beings, mainly non-combatant civilians, primarily old and infirm, women and children. The threat posed by conventional arms cannot be ignored any further.

(Mr. Wyzner, Poland)

The early re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments, with an appropriate mandate accommodating all points of view, or any other mode of dealing with the issue, would, therefore, be a step in the right direction. In his message to the CD which I referred to a while ago, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali also urged the Conference on Disarmament to continue efforts to develop universal, non-discriminatory, practical means to increase openness and transparency in military matters. In his view - which we fully share - the Conference has not entirely exhausted its potential in the field of TIA. Openness and transparency in the conventional area are the keys to enhanced trust and confidence. Without them, efforts to promote a cooperative security architecture, globally or regionally, are unlikely to inspire confidence.

There is a wealth of ideas and proposals which have been submitted to the TIA Ad Hoc Committee, including those on the possible expansion and improvement of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. They have not been explored in depth, as they should have been. Providing for an early opportunity to address in earnest the broad and varied question of conventional arms by the CD would introduce the indispensable element of balance to its agenda. What is also important, such a step would vindicate the standing of the CD as a time-tested forum for multilateral arms negotiations which is in close touch with present-day realities.

Let me also take this opportunity to refer to an issue actively pursued in Geneva, though not in the CD context. I mean anti-personnel land-mines. Poland attaches particular importance to this issue. For us it has two specific connotations: one of a historic nature, another of a more recent character. The minefields, in Poland a deadly legacy of World War II, are still claiming - as they have for the last 50 years - a toll of killed and maimed, mostly children. The "killing fields" elsewhere are a daily threat to the personnel of the United Nations peace-keeping operations, including its sizeable Polish component. We, therefore, note with satisfaction the efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Pending successful conclusion of these efforts, we see a pressing need for much wider ratification of the Convention and its three protocols. An immediate improvement of the situation can result from moratoria imposed on the export of anti-personnel land-mines. Like some other countries Poland has observed such a moratorium in practice for the last two years and shall introduce in the near future an appropriate legal act to that effect.

In a few weeks the future of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty will be determined. This year may also witness the implementation of START I and the ratification of START II, the treaties that will reduce by two thirds the inventory of strategic warheads deployed at the end of the cold war. The year 1995 may, moreover, see the chemical weapons Convention go into effect as a result of the growing rate of ratifications. In their number will soon be the instrument of ratification submitted by my country. Efforts will also continue to enhance the effectiveness of the biological weapons Convention by providing it with a legally binding compliance verification mechanism, a goal to which Poland is strongly committed. It is evident, then, that the current year will be one of important events in the area of international security, arms control and disarmament. For Poland their significance is unmistakable and fully consonant with our stated intention to seek integration with the Atlantic Alliance - the principal factor of stability and security in Europe.

To conclude, let me express the conviction that the successful elaboration of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and the productive pursuit of a fissionable material cut-off agreement will come as further confirmation of the important role which this body has been playing and will have to play in the years ahead. I am confident that the Conference on Disarmament will go on discharging its role in that respect most commendably.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Poland for his statement and for his kind words to me. Bardzo dziękuję za bardzo ważny statement (Thank you very much for the very important statement).

We have a long list of speakers for this morning. As of now, the list stands at 15 or 16 and may grow. This means that we should be prepared to meet again this afternoon if need be, which would be at 3.30 p.m., but as I said, if need be. So let us wait and see how the situation will be by 1 p.m.

I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Zahran.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, let me start by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I am gratified to see a fellow African occupying such an important position. You personally, Ambassador Don Nanjira, have played an important role, *inter alia*, in the preparations for the World Conference on Human Rights, the coordination of African positions in WIPO and the Trade and Development Board, until last week, and at other events. You also come from a fraternal African State with which Egypt has links of cooperation and lasting friendship. It is now your turn to make your contribution in the field of disarmament as President of the Conference. I wish you every success in your mission and I can promise you full cooperation from the Egyptian delegation. I would be remiss if I did not also thank Ambassador Kurokochi of Japan for her commendable endeavours during her term of office. We also wish to welcome most warmly among us Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan, with whom we have cooperated in the past, and whose presence here at the Conference on Disarmament will surely enrich our deliberations.

Before dealing with the subject-matter that this statement is essentially devoted to, I would like to express our satisfaction at the recent adherence of Cuba to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Treaty and its protocols henceforth apply throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. For Egypt, such a development is all the more significant given the ongoing efforts made by Egypt and other countries to establish, in the Middle East, a zone free from nuclear weapons and indeed from all weapons of mass destruction. We hope that these efforts will soon bear fruit and that positive progress will be achieved towards the creation of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone in accordance with the decision taken by the African summit held in Cairo in 1964. We are now on the eve of the Conference to review and extend the non-proliferation Treaty.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

It is, we feel, timely to put on record Egypt's position with respect to the decision by the Conference on Disarmament, in its plenary of 23 March, to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. At the outset, it gives me great pleasure to acknowledge with appreciation the role played by Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, whose tireless efforts in this regard have finally been crowned with success. Nevertheless a long road lies before us, and much work will need to be done if we are to achieve the objective for which that Committee was established.

After the Conference on Disarmament adopted the report submitted by Ambassador Shannon, a number of delegations felt it necessary to set forth, for the record, their understanding of the circumstances which made it possible for the Conference on Disarmament to adopt, by consensus, his report on this issue. The Egyptian delegation for its part views the report presented by Ambassador Shannon as a comprehensive and integrated document. Thus, the three points quoted from the text of resolution 48/75 L cannot be viewed in isolation from the three paragraphs that immediately follow, or from those that precede them. Plainly, the report of Ambassador Shannon as a whole represents, in our view, the mandate of the said Ad Hoc Committee.

The Egyptian delegation joined the consensus on Ambassador Shannon's report notwithstanding the fact that it does not reflect, in the clearest of terms, our main preoccupations and concerns. We are well aware of the fact that some other delegations also joined the consensus in a spirit of compromise. We are hopeful that the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee will, given the necessary political will and commitment, allow for a convergence of views which, in turn, will translate into rapid progress in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

I would like at this stage to outline, in general terms, what it is that Egypt expects from the Ad Hoc Committee on a fissile material ban, which will carry out its work, as we understand it, under item 2 of the Conference on Disarmament agenda currently entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". We view the issue of a fissile material ban from both a disarmament and a non-proliferation perspective. We aspire to a result from our work which will not merely freeze an existing situation but will go beyond such a laudable, though modest objective. A ban encompassing only future production of weapons-usable fissile materials (i.e. a strictly non-proliferation approach to the issue) would clearly imply that existing stocks are perceived by those who own them as having a role to play in the future. Such an implication does not reassure those who feel threatened by nuclear weapons and who would like to see them banned. This is not new, this is in compliance with the objective of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. Furthermore, excluding stocks from the scope of the Ad Hoc Committee's deliberations would be tantamount to consolidating the status quo for nuclear-weapon States and rewarding undeclared nuclear-weapon States. The latter, who have remained outside the NPT, will legitimately conclude, yet again, that it is ultimately their interests which are being served and safeguarded, and not those of countries which have renounced the nuclear option and which joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, faithfully abiding by their obligations deriving from that Treaty and accepting international supervision.

It is worthwhile in this respect to recall that General Assembly resolution 48/75 L recommended the negotiation of a "treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". It did not use the word "future" to qualify the term "production" and it is for this reason that we, together with others, voted in favour of that resolution. A ban which would cover both past as well as future production (i.e. the disarmament approach) would not only indicate that there is a clear and unequivocal commitment from all States to engage in meaningful nuclear disarmament, but would also avoid giving the impression that it is advantageous to remain outside the NPT and to pursue, in all impunity, a clandestine, extremely dangerous and sometimes purposefully ambiguous nuclear programme.

It is clear from the above that we view the scope of a fissile material ban as a comprehensive and all-encompassing one which must address production and cover stockpiles as well, because, as mentioned above, it was in that spirit and on that understanding that we joined the consensus on resolution 48/75 L in 1993.

During the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee we will also have to agree on what exactly is meant by "fissile material", and we will also have to determine whether or not a clear distinction can always be made between so-called "civilian" fissile materials on the one hand and "military" fissile materials on the other. It is our view that the Ad Hoc Committee on a fissile material ban will have to address all fissile materials which could be used in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Special attention will have to be given to the question of dual-use materials such as plutonium and uranium. The objective we should aim for is to prohibit comprehensively all fissile materials capable of being used in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

Verification is also a complex issue which will have to be dealt with. In this context it is clear that stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile materials which exist in many parts of the world will have to be declared and inventoried. Such a step would serve as the basis for any verification regime. In the absence of verifiable inventories of weapons-usable fissile materials there will be no clear-cut way of ascertaining, in cases of doubt or suspicion, whether the fissile materials in question were produced or otherwise acquired (for instance, transferred or purchased) after the entry into force of the projected treaty or whether they had been produced or otherwise acquired prior to that time. Naturally, declarations and detailed inventories of existing fissile materials would represent only the first steps in a series of measures to be agreed which would ultimately result in the placing of all weapons-useable materials under international control. To this end, the capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency will need to be enhanced. All fissile materials capable of being used in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices should be subjected to an improved comprehensive safeguard mechanism of the Agency. Such a mechanism should include regular monitoring and challenge inspections if necessary, covering all fissile material production and storage facilities in all States and at all times, bearing in mind the importance of full implementation of the provisions of article IV of the NPT, which does permit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

These were some general remarks which reflect our basic thinking on the issue of a fissile material ban and which represent the general framework within which we intend to deal with this important issue. We look forward to hearing the views of others and to engaging in frank dialogue and businesslike negotiations in order to fulfil the Committee's mandate, which the Conference on Disarmament agreed to at its plenary session on 23 March this year. Our views on this issue coincide with those of a considerable number of delegations in the Conference on Disarmament, as most recently reflected in the statement of Ambassador Saboia of Brazil before the CD's plenary on 30 March. They are also in keeping with the letter and spirit of part V of the final document (CD 1261) adopted by consensus at the Eleventh Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Cairo in 1994, which stated:

> "The Ministers [that is to say the Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement] considered that a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation ..."

For the record, I would also like to state that the start of negotiations on a fissile material ban under item 2 of the Conference on Disarmament agenda should in no way prejudice the Egyptian request, supported by the Group of 21, for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to deal with a separate item on nuclear disarmament. This request remains valid, and if no consensus exists on the establishment of the said ad hoc committee now, then at the very least special coordinators should be appointed without further delay to deal with this issue as well as that of the Conference on Disarmament's agenda, in keeping with Conference practice.

The negotiations currently being conducted by the Conference on Disarmament on a nuclear test ban are unfortunately proceeding at a slower pace than we had expected. We are fully aware of the difficulty of the negotiations; however, we also feel very strongly that more progress could have been achieved during the first part of the 1995 CD session in order to give a positive signal on the subject to the NPT review and extension Conference which will start in just a few days now on 17 April. We hope that it will be possible to make up for this delay, that the negotiations will proceed more swiftly during the second part of the session of the CD and that serious inter-sessional work will bring us significantly closer to our objective, namely conclusion of the negotiations on the treaty in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. In this respect I wish to highlight one issue which is of particular concern to my delegation and to a considerable number of CD members, namely the scope of the comprehensive test-ban treaty. A nuclear test ban must be comprehensive in scope and should not allow for any nuclear explosions to take place under any pretext, i.e., whether for peaceful or other purposes. To allow for exceptions would run fundamentally counter to the spirit of our negotiations, and we sincerely hope that those who advocate such exceptions will review their positions so that the necessary political will and the needed good faith can exist in order to achieve a treaty prohibiting all nuclear tests, thereby substantially strengthening the NPT.

On the eve of the NPT review and extension Conference the issue of security assurances is on everyone's mind. However, no credible and satisfactory assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons yet exist and the political will to provide them is not yet available. What we need is real and not solely formal assurances. We reiterate that the acceptable solution to this problem is the negotiation, on a multilateral basis, of a legally binding international instrument under which those who have renounced the nuclear option would be given comprehensive positive as well as negative security assurances. An even better solution to this question would be nuclear disarmament, total nuclear disarmament, through the full application of article VI of the NPT. We have said this on several occasions. If there is opposition to any amendment of the NPT on the grounds that it is a legally binding internationally negotiated instrument, we could have a protocol which could be negotiated and annexed to the NPT. Several delegations share this view, which was expressed at the last meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, and we also stated this at the third Prepcom prior to the Conference to review and extend the NPT. This continues to be our position on the matter.

As a member of the Group of 21 I cannot end my statement without paying a special tribute to Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, the permanent representative of Mexico, who is attending this his last plenary meeting prior to leaving Geneva. Ambassador Bosch's participation in the work of the Conference on Disarmament will be sorely missed. I wish him, his family and his country, Mexico, every success and well-being for the future, and I hope that his country will be able to find a worthy successor to him.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Kazakhstan, Ambassador Kabdrakhmanov.

Mr. KABDRAKHMANOV (Kazakhstan) (translated from French): First of all allow me to convey the gratitude of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Conference on Disarmament for the good will shown in solving the question of our country's joining this highly reputed international organization. The presence of the Republic of Kazakhstan as an observer in the Conference on Disarmament is testimony to the ever-growing role of Kazakhstan in consolidating global security. It is at the same time a sufficient appreciation of the efforts made by our country to guarantee the non-proliferation regime for weapons of mass extermination and the disarmament process.

Events in the last decade have shown that the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is becoming quite real and continuous and endangers general security. The development and proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and of missile technologies have an influence on the economic, political, social and military aspects of international life today. That is why, since it acquired sovereignty, Kazakhstan has attached a great deal of importance to the work done by the Conference on Disarmament which is a multilateral negotiating body. Kazakhstan has acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State. It is a party to the Treaty for the reduction and limitation of strategic arms. It has signed the Convention prohibiting chemical weapons. The Republic is also involved in other disarmament processes. Kazakhstan also attaches importance to the signing of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, especially in the light of the international situation during the run-up to the Conference for the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. We support the focusing of negotiations in the context of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament in order to conclude a universal and verifiable treaty. There is no doubt that a treaty of this nature could become an effective instrument to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and contribute to nuclear disarmament and thus to the consolidation of peace and overall security.

(continued in Russian)

The voice of a representative of Kazakhstan is being heard here for the first time today at a session of the Conference on Disarmament. That is why I have been brief in my statement. In the future we shall try to live up to the trust placed in us and contribute to solving problems which are of urgent interest for individual regions and for the world community as a whole. Our President, Mr. Nazarbaev, intends to take part in one of the Conference's sessions and deliver an address on these issues.

Kazakhstan considers that it is difficult to overestimate the contribution made by the Conference on Disarmament to the strengthening of international security and stability. Its work covers a wide range of issues including nuclear security guarantees, transparency in armaments and the prevention of an arms race in outer space - practically all the issues of multilateral control over armaments and disarmament. Ample testimony is provided by the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention prohibiting environmental modification for military or other hostile purposes, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons. We are convinced that the Conference on Disarmament will promote the further strengthening of overall security in the interests of the international community.

In conclusion, Sir, I would like to wish you success in your responsible position.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Kazakhstan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco, Ambassador Benjelloun-Touimi.

Mr. BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and to wish you every success in your duties. I also would like to take this opportunity to convey my warm thanks and those of my delegation to Ambassador Kurokochi for the patient and effective work she

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accomplished during her term of office. My wishes for success also go to Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, and the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail.

We are also very alive to the significance of the departure of Ambassador Marín Bosch. Of course, I did not have an opportunity to get to know him all that well, but his reputation is there - he played an outstanding role in the work of the Conference, particularly as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Hence our best wishes for success go to him in his new duties and in his personal life. I would also like to take this opportunity to convey a formal welcome to Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan.

It is a truism to say nowadays that the Conference on Disarmament is at a crucial point in its existence. Multilateral disarmament issues are more than ever at the centre of attention. The turning-point marked by the holding of the NPT extension Conference is an eloquent example of this and it is in the clear interest of the entire international community to contribute to it, in a spirit of compromise and understanding, in order to ensure the extension of this Treaty. My delegation has always considered that this Treaty played a fundamental role in nuclear non-proliferation. The regime attached to this Treaty must continue to produce its effects and to be applied universally. In our view, and as His Majesty Hassan II has underlined in recent statements, the wisest way of strengthening nuclear non-proliferation is to guarantee its universality, so that the security needs of all States parties are taken into account. To this end, two principles should be taken into consideration. The purpose of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty is to ensure that nuclear disarmament becomes an irreversible process. It is a matter of vital importance to all mankind which must therefore be dealt with in a thorough fashion during the New York Conference. The efforts already made by certain nuclear Powers, inter alia through the signing of the START I and START II agreements, are encouraging. These efforts must form part of an overall approach to the problem of nuclear disarmament, the ultimate purpose of which is to dismantle the whole array of existing nuclear arsenals.

In our view the NPT is also intended to permit the use of nuclear technologies for peaceful and exclusively peaceful purposes. That is why we believe that the decisions taken at the Conference for the review and extension of this Treaty should reflect the possibility of further developing cooperation among the parties concerned by this type of cooperation, under the supervision of IAEA, whose safeguards are essential to the entire system. They affect the very credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

I would also like to venture a number of comments on the work of the Conference on Disarmament itself, the success of which partially depends on the outcome of the work on the NPT. Today, after the adoption of the Convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons and the commencement of negotiations on a nuclear test ban, we can only welcome the direction taken by the Conference in a number of areas, despite the obstacles encountered here and there. In this connection, my delegation fully shares the view that the work on the nuclear-test-ban treaty must accentuate the role of a negotiating body that the Conference on Disarmament has been assigned. This text should

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comprehensively ban all nuclear tests once and for all. Of course, such a prohibition would lack credibility if it were not backed up by verification and monitoring machinery in order to ensure that the treaty is properly applied, satisfying the expectations and concerns of all. Hence we feel that the idea of basing the verification system on methods of detecting seismic events is the most realistic one, in view of the experience already acquired with the use of such methods and its reliability.

With respect to the other planned techniques or so-called non-seismic methods, the gradual approach based on selective use of such methods seems to be the most well-founded, given the urgent need to reduce the total costs of these operations.

The sought-after adoption of the nuclear-test-ban treaty must above all mark a decisive step in the context of nuclear disarmament. This at least is our view of the matter. Indeed, our approach is justified not merely by the expected impact of such a ban in terms of experiments with nuclear weapons, but also the hope which should be aroused for a redefinition of choices by the nuclear Powers. Naturally, we are also very alive to the arguments seeking to make this ban a decisive element in the maintenance and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. The danger of seeing this regime, so vital to international security, weaken, exists, and one cannot underestimate the dangers of proliferation which could result from a failure or any thoughtless delay in the negotiations. That is why the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Dembinski, deserves all our support in his plan to present, within a short deadline, a rolling text which would come as close as possible to the ultimate version we would arrive at.

The question of the provision of security assurances also figures among the priorities on which we should focus our efforts. This is a matter of fundamental importance, since we believe it is closely linked to the outcome of the NPT extension Conference and the legitimate interests of the non-nuclear States. We think that the time has come to end the long debate on this subject and to make practical proposals for the definition and the scope of these guarantees. We have always expressed our preference for a legally binding instrument in this field. We hope to see this objective achieved during the discussions which will deal with the extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty.

By pursuing intensive activities in the areas already mentioned, and soon, we hope, also in that of prohibition of the production of fissile materials, the Conference is demonstrating its credibility and its unique role in multilateral disarmament. The audience it has acquired and the interest it has aroused should steer us towards the adoption of a rapid decision on its expansion. In this respect we continue to view the so-called O'Sullivan proposal as one which is balanced and offers the Conference a highly appropriate membership in the work that awaits us. This matter has gone on only too long, and the time has come for wisdom to prevail and to open the way to a composition of the Conference that properly reflects the new international realities which we cannot disregard. The Conference would therefore be well advised to designate speedily a special coordinator who would continue consultations in order to remove the remaining obstacles to expansion.

My delegation also notes with regret the delay in the resumption of the work of the Conference on Disarmament on a number of items appearing on its agenda. For our part, the Moroccan delegation has energetically supported since the outset the principle of re-establishing all the ad hoc committees dealing with these matters, as well as the commencement of discussions on the review of the agenda and ways of improving the effectiveness of the Conference. We can only express the hope that with the resumption of our present session and after the hopefully satisfactory conclusion of the NPT Conference, we will be in a position to give fresh momentum to our work, refraining - and I think I can emphasize this - refraining from giving undue importance to organizational and procedural matters.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Morocco for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, may I first of all express my congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament? I can assure you the fullest cooperation of my delegation, and I wish you success as we pursue our important work.

Yesterday in Washington, Secretary of State Warren Christopher set forth, on behalf of President Clinton, United States policy on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Our policy on security assurances is presented in the form of a declaration by the President.

In view of the Conference on Disarmament's great interest in security assurances, it is my privilege today to place this declaration on the record of the Conference. I begin with the text that the Secretary of State used in introducing the President's declaration.

> "The United States believes that universal adherence to and compliance with international conventions and treaties seeking to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a cornerstone of global security. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a central element of this regime. 5 March 1995 was the twenty-fifth anniversary of its entry into force, an event commemorated by President Clinton in a speech in Washington on 1 March 1995. A conference to decide on extension of the Treaty will begin in New York City on 17 April 1995. The United States considers the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without conditions as a matter of the highest national priority and will continue to pursue all appropriate efforts designed to achieve that outcome.

"It is important that all parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons fulfil their obligations under the Treaty. In that regard, consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must be in compliance with these undertakings in order to be eligible for any benefits of adherence to this Treaty.

"As a nuclear-weapon State the United States has consistently recognized its responsibilities under the Treaty, and the importance of addressing the special needs of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty with regard to measures that would alleviate their legitimate security concerns. To that end, the President directed that the United States review its policies on security assurances for such non-nuclear-weapon States and that consultations be held with other nuclear-weapon States on this important topic."

Bearing in mind the above considerations the President declared the following - and this is the beginning of the actual security assurance declaration:

"The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

"Aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon State permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression. Any State which commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatens such aggression must be aware that its actions are to be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression.

"Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have a legitimate desire for assurances that the United Nations Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would act immediately in accordance with the Charter, in the event such non-nuclear-weapon States are the victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

"The United States affirms its intention to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of, or an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

"Among the means available to the Security Council for assisting such a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would be an investigation into the situation and appropriate measures to settle the dispute and to restore international peace and security.

"United Nations Member States should take appropriate measures in response to a request for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance from a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of aggression with nuclear weapons, and the Security Council should consider what measures are needed in this regard in the event of such an act of aggression.

"The Security Council should recommend appropriate procedures, in response to any request from a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is the victim of such an act of aggression, regarding compensation under international law from the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained as a result of the aggression.

"The United States reaffirms the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

This is the end of the declaration.

Mr. President, this concludes the United States declaration on security assurances. I would ask that this statement today be circulated as a CD document.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. His statement shall be circulated as requested. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Sir Michael Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mheshimiwa Rais, uniruhusu kukupongeza mwenye wako wa kiti cha halmashauri huyu na kukuondoa shaka ya kila ushirika wa ujumbe wa kiingereza (Mr. President, congratulations on your appointment as President of this Conference. Be assured of the fullest cooperation of the British delegation).

The Government of the United Kingdom believe that universal adherence to and compliance with international agreements seeking to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are vital to the maintenance of world security. We note with appreciation that 175 States have become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

We believe that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime which has made an invaluable contribution to international peace and security. We are convinced that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely and without conditions.

We will continue to urge all States that have not done so to become parties to the Treaty.

The Government of the United Kingdom recognize that States which have renounced nuclear weapons are entitled to look for assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. In 1978 we gave such an assurance. Assurances have also been given by the other nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Recognizing the continued concern of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that the assurances given by nuclear-weapon States should be in similar terms, and following consultation with the other nuclear-weapon States, I accordingly give the following undertaking on behalf of my Government.

The United Kingdom will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

In giving this assurance the United Kingdom emphasizes the need not only for universal adherence to, but also for compliance with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this context I wish to make clear that Her Majesty's Government do not regard their assurance as applicable if any beneficiary is in material breach of its own non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In 1968 the United Kingdom declared that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression in accordance with the United Nations Charter, which calls for taking "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace". Therefore, any State which commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatens such aggression must be aware that its actions are to be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression.

I, therefore, recall and reaffirm the intention of the United Kingdom, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State, party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

This Security Council assistance could include measures to settle the dispute and restore international peace and security, and appropriate procedures, in response to any request from the victim of such an act of aggression, regarding compensation under international law from the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained as a result of the aggression.

If a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a victim of an act of aggression with nuclear weapons, the United Kingdom would also be prepared to take appropriate measures in response to a request from the victim for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance.

The United Kingdom reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

I should be grateful if the secretariat would take the necessary steps to register this declaration as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

While I have the floor, I should also like to make a statement concerning the scope of the CTBT. As my delegation has made clear from the outset, our aim is to establish a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapons test explosions. We consider that such a ban, effectively verified and commanding universal adherence, would contribute significantly to meeting the international community's objectives of non-proliferation and global security. It would also place severe constraints on the five nuclear-weapons States, but the United Kingdom, in common with the other nuclear-weapon States, will continue to bear the responsibility of ensuring the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons. This point was stressed in the statement that I made on behalf of the United Kingdom and France on 8 March 1995 in Working Group 2. At that time, we retained the bracketed reference to exceptional explosions in the draft article on scope. We have listened carefully to the views of other delegations and have taken them into consideration. I am happy to be able to say that we are now prepared to withdraw the phrase on exceptional tests. We would, therefore, agree to this being deleted from the revised version of the rolling text. This decision in no way diminishes our responsibility to ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons. I would like to state for the record that we consider that the "scope" article in the treaty should not be interpreted as prohibiting the United Kingdom, in common with the other nuclear-weapon States, from fulfilling its responsibilities to maintain the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me, and I congratulate him on his mastery of Swahili. Asante sana (Thank you very much). I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, my delegation is delighted to see you presiding over the Conference. Your wisdom, experience and authority will be valuable to us in our work. I would also like to convey my greetings to you as the representative of a friendly country and the representative of a continent with which France has so many ties of friendship, cooperation and common destiny. I would also like to pay tribute to the Ambassador of Japan, Mrs. Kurokochi, and the Ambassador of Italy, Ambassador Vattani, your predecessors, for the exemplary way in which they carried out their important functions. I would also like to bid welcome to our new colleague from Pakistan, Ambassador Akram. And, finally, I sincerely regret the departure from the Conference of my friend Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, whose breadth of vision and firm positions, even if they did not correspond to ours, always made a major contribution for our Conference and were a spur for my own delegation. There are friendships based on shared convictions; there are others, no less strong and no less durable, which are forged in mutual respect and the complicity arising from cordial disagreement. I will maintain that kind of friendship with Miguel Marín Bosch. I extend the warmest wishes to him, his family, and every success in his new task.

The question of security assurances given by the nuclear Powers to non-nuclear States is a major issue for my delegation, firstly because it corresponds to a real expectation on the part of the non-nuclear countries, particularly those which, in signing the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), have renounced the goal of acquiring atomic weapons, secondly because our special responsibilities as a nuclear Power are at stake, and lastly because this issue has taken on new significance since the end of the cold war, as awareness has grown of the threat posed to all by the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is in order to respond to this expectation, to shoulder its responsibilities and to make a contribution to efforts to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons, that France has decided to adopt the following measures.

First, it wishes to clarify and reaffirm the negative security assurances it gave in 1982. Specifically, France reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on it, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a State, in alliance or association with a nuclear-weapon State.

In our view it is natural that the beneficiaries of these assurances should be the signatories to the NPT - that is, the vast majority of the countries of the world - since they have entered into a formal commitment to non-proliferation.

In response to the requests made by a large number of countries, France has also sought to harmonize the content of its negative assurances to the maximum extent possible with those of the other nuclear Powers. We are happy that this effort has succeeded. The declarations concerning negative security assurances made by France, the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, are now practically identical.

Secondly, France has decided for the first time to give positive security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. This decision became both possible and desirable following France's accession to the NPT. Consequently, France considers that any act of aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would threaten international peace and security. France recognizes that it is legitimate for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT to be assured that the international community, and first and foremost the United Nations Security Council, would react immediately in accordance with the obligations under the Charter in the event that they were victims of or threatened with aggression using nuclear weapons.

Bearing these considerations in mind, France makes the following declaration:

France, as a permanent member of the Security Council, undertakes in the event of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT to bring the matter before the Security Council without delay and to work within the Council to ensure that the Council takes immediate steps to provide the requisite assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to a State that is the victim of an act of aggression or the threat thereof.

France reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

In this field too we welcome the fact that the content of these positive assurances was the subject of close consultation with the other nuclear Powers.

Thirdly, together with the four other nuclear Powers, France has decided to put before the United Nations Security Council a draft resolution which is pathbreaking in many respects, and which reflects our resolve to respond to the expectations of the international community in a comprehensive, collective and concrete manner. Comprehensive, because for the first time, a draft resolution encompasses both negative assurances and positive assurances. Collective, because the five nuclear Powers are co-sponsoring such a resolution for the first time. Concrete, because for the first time a

Security Council resolution spells out the steps that the Security Council might take in the event of aggression, in particular as regards dispute settlement, humanitarian assistance and compensation to victims.

The draft resolution formally reaffirms the need for all States parties to the NPT to respect their obligations fully. This is not a case of petitio principii, but the reiteration of a fundamental rule. The draft also emphasizes the desirability of universal accession to the NPT.

The decisions I have just announced reflect our determination to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and especially the NPT, of which it is the keystone. It is our hope and firm conviction that the initiatives we have taken will help to achieve that end.

I would be grateful to you, Sir, if you would take the necessary steps to ensure that this document is recorded and distributed as an official document of the Conference.

I would now like to make the following statement on behalf of the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and my own country, in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty Conference.

We wish to express our continuing strong support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is our desire that the forthcoming review and extension Conference in New York should decide on its indefinite and unconditional continuation in force. We express our determination to continue to implement fully all the provisions of the Treaty, including those in article VI.

We welcome the fact that the nuclear arms race has ceased. We hail the fact that, in parallel with the fundamental changes that have taken place with respect to international security, important steps have been taken towards nuclear disarmament, as a result of the agreements on deep reductions in the nuclear armaments of the Russian Federation and the United States of America as well as the significant reductions made by France and the United Kingdom in their nuclear-weapon programmes.

We welcome the important progress made at the Conference on Disarmament in the multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, to which our four countries are contributing actively.

We also welcome the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee with a mandate to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral, internationally effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes or other explosive purposes. We urge that the negotiations begin forthwith.

We underline the importance of the harmonized security assurances which we have given to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT against the use of nuclear weapons. We also underline the importance of the commitments as regards the provision of appropriate assistance to a non-nuclear-weapon

State party to the NPT victim of aggression or the threat of aggression with nuclear weapons. We believe that these decisions strengthen international peace and security.

We solemnly reaffirm our commitment, as stated in article VI of the NPT, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remains our ultimate goal.

We reaffirm our determination to negotiate intensively, as a high priority, a universal and multilaterally effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We pledge our support for its conclusion without delay.

We call upon all States parties to the NPT to make the Treaty permanent, which will be crucial for the full realization of the goals set out in article VI of the Treaty.

We call upon all States that are not parties to the NPT to accede to it rapidly, thereby contributing to the enhancement of both regional and global security.

A truly universal and fully implemented Treaty is in the interests of all.

Mr. President, the delegations on whose behalf I have just spoken would be grateful if you could have this statement recorded and distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me, and his request shall be carried out accordingly. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Akram.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. President, although I cannot address you in Swahili, I would like to extend my warm felicitations to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in a language which is common and learnt from those who have learnt your language and, I suspect, mine. I am confident that the work of the Conference will benefit greatly from your long experience and able leadership. My delegation will make every effort to facilitate your task by extending its wholehearted cooperation and support. I would also like to express our admiration for the highly skilled and competent manner in which your predecessor, Ambassador Hisami Kurokochi of Japan, guided the deliberations of this body.

I take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude for the warm words of welcome which have been addressed to me by yourself, Mr. President, and by so many other colleagues and friends. It is good to be back in this important body and especially to see so many old friends who remain intensely engaged in the endeavour for disarmament. It will be my endeavour to work in close cooperation with all our distinguished colleagues within the Conference on

Disarmament. My one regret is that I will be denied the opportunity to work together with Ambassador Marín Bosch, who is leaving us. We bid him well and wish him all the best for the future.

This first part of the 1995 session of the Conference has been held in the shadow of the forthcoming NPT review and extension Conference. This has perhaps coloured the positions taken here on some of the substantive and procedural issues under consideration.

As my Foreign Minister stated in this Conference on 14 February last, "The NPT does not respond to Pakistan's security concerns and we deplore its discriminatory character. However, we favour the extension of the Treaty because we acknowledge that a breakdown in the NPT consensus would have negative implications for international stability". It is our fear however that the fragile NPT consensus could unravel if the Treaty is seen by its sponsors as a means to perpetuate inequality and discrimination. The NPT was supposed to be a transitional arrangement to enable the five nuclear-weapon States to negotiate nuclear disarmament, as stipulated in article VI of the Treaty. It was not designed to create in perpetuity two categories of states - nuclear and non-nuclear.

The first 20 years after the adoption of the NPT saw a massive build-up of nuclear arsenals specially by the two super-Powers. We have welcomed the START I and START II agreements under which these huge nuclear arsenals are to be drastically reduced. These are indeed important achievements. We consider, however, that the 3,000 nuclear warheads which each side will retain after these reductions are out of proportion to any conceivable security requirement of these States. Indeed, the size of these nuclear arsenals after implementation of START I and II will be as large as if not larger than when the NPT came into force.

We are also deeply concerned that although the confrontation of the cold war has ended, there is as yet no clear commitment on the part of the majority of the nuclear-weapon States to the goal of complete nuclear disarmament. The resistance to opening negotiations on nuclear disarmament in this body is a clear signal of this.

The discussions so far on a comprehensive test-ban treaty have produced mixed results. While a revised rolling text will indicate a measure of progress, agreement on key issues has proved to be elusive. A central aim of a CTBT has always been to halt the further development of nuclear weapons and to eventually render nuclear arsenals ineffective and redundant. The CTBT was to be an instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation and to facilitate nuclear disarmament. The desire expressed in our negotiations to maintain the so-called credibility of nuclear arsenals through exceptional measures is, in our view, incompatible with the purposes of the CTBT. If these exceptions are accepted the CTBT will become merely an instrument of selective horizontal non-proliferation. Nevertheless, I would like to reiterate the commitment of my delegation to continue to work energetically for the early conclusion of a meaningful and comprehensive and effective CTBT.

Our endeavours to commence consideration of the fissile materials convention have been bedevilled by the underlying divergence in our view as regards the purpose and scope of the proposed treaty. The historical record will show that the objective of the international community has always been to halt the production of fissile materials and to reduce the stockpiles of such materials. The object was never to freeze fissile material stocks at their current grossly unequal levels.

Despite our serious concerns, the Pakistan delegation agreed to the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the basis of Ambassador Shannon's report. The report makes it clear that no delegation will be precluded from addressing the issue of the appropriate scope of the proposed treaty during the negotiations.

This session of the CD will end without any work having been done on a number of important issues on its agenda. We are disappointed at our failure to establish ad hoc committees on the prevention of a nuclear arms race in outer space, transparency in armaments and negative security assurances. A deadlock also exists on the appointment of special coordinators on the issues of the agenda, expansion of the CD and improved and effective functioning. We must seriously consider whether the linkages that were created between various issues constitute a precedent or a practice that will advance the work of this Conference in future.

It was Pakistan's desire to establish ad hoc committees and commence negotiations on all the items of our agenda. We are most disappointed, in particular, that the Conference could not re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances, an item which has been of long-standing interest for Pakistan. This is all the more regrettable since we have learnt that the nuclear-weapon States have devoted considerable effort in recent weeks to developing their positions on both so-called "positive" and "negative" assurances to non-nuclear States, at least to those which are parties to the NPT.

Let me recall that before resolution 255 was submitted for adoption to the Security Council in the form of a joint draft resolution, it was originally submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States (document DC/230, annex II). It would be strange if the Conference on Disarmament - the "single negotiating body" on disarmament - were precluded from the consideration of a matter of such vital interest to international security as the question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

It is, of course, premature for my delegation to comment on the substance of the "positive" assurances being formulated, or the negative assurances expressed in the statements made here today. I will however recall that while commenting on resolution 255 in the Security Council, the representative of Pakistan stated:

> "Perfect security for all States against the peril of nuclear weapons will not of course be possible until, as the representative of France has pointed out, there is complete nuclear disarmament and

> destruction of nuclear weapons. We must perforce accept a security system which is less than perfect and short of the ideal. At the same time, if we ignore the other facts of life we do so at our own peril. As long as nuclear stockpiles are not physically dismantled, as long as the non-proliferation Treaty is not universally adhered to, the possibility of a treaty breach will always remain, of the emergence of other Powers which will have acquired nuclear weapons, and even, in the unforeseeable future, of an existing nuclear Power changing its policies. It is such possibilities, which are more than theoretical, that we need to guard against."

If a resolution of the Security Council is to genuinely enhance international security it would need to address these problems.

Moreover, any decision on security assurances should not, in any way, prejudice the provisions of the United Nations Charter or international law. The right of individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter is available to every State. It is not restricted to non-nuclear States party to the NPT. The Charter provides an assurance of help to all States through and outside the Security Council in case they are subjected to the use of force or aggression. This assurance is available whether this aggression takes place with nuclear or other weapons. In any event, the credibility of an assurance through the Security Council of help against the use of nuclear weapons requires a leap of faith. How can the Council act if a nuclear aggression is already under way? And what if this aggression is being perpetrated by one of those States which wield the veto in the Security Council?

In a statement issued on 14 April 1982 (CD/280), the Group of 21 set out certain "principles" regarding what are called "negative security assurances". Let met quote these "principles". First, the nuclear-weapon States have an obligation to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Second, non-nuclear-weapon States have the right to be assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Third, such assurances should be provided in a legally binding and multilaterally negotiated international instrument. The Group of 21 notes with satisfaction that there is no objection, in principle, within the Committee on Disarmament to the idea of an international convention. Fourth, a common formula or common approach to be included in an international instrument on this question should be clear and credible, and respond both to the legitimate security concerns of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear-weapon States as well as to the views of the Group of 21. Fifth, the agreement on this question should encompass commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament and pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The Pakistan delegation looks forward to the close consideration of these views of the Group of 21 when the CD resumes late next month and re-establishes the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances.

Pakistan shares the view that the CD has an important role to play in promoting arms control and disarmament in the conventional field. We have no problem with the resumption of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. However, we feel that an approach to conventional arms control which is based only on a supply-side strategy is bound to create further distortions in the already wide asymmetries in the possession, production and transfer of conventional armaments.

We need to move beyond the truisms expressed in some discussions on conventional arms control. We should come to grips with the real and practical issues in the area of conventional arms control. Today, arms races in various parts of the world are not fuelled by global disputes but rather by regional discord between States that are in actual, or potential, adversarial roles. Therefore, conventional arms control measures should be pursued at the regional and subregional levels.

The General Assembly, in a resolution entitled "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels", has asked the Conference on Disarmament to consider the formulation of guidelines and principles which can provide a framework for regional agreements for controlling conventional weapons. We hope that the Conference will soon undertake work on this importance issue.

In conclusion, Mr. President, may I again assure you that the Pakistan delegation looks forward keenly to working with you and other delegations on the entire range of issues before the Conference?

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Sha.

Mr. SHA (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, please allow me to congratulate you warmly on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. The Chinese delegation would like to pledge to you that as always it will make every effort in rendering full cooperation to you and to all the other delegations for the cause of promoting peace, security and disarmament. I wish also to take this opportunity to thank Her Excellency Mrs. Hisami Kurokochi, the distinguished Ambassador of Japan, for her outstanding contribution during her tenure of the presidency of the CD last month. Furthermore, I would like to tell the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch, how sorry we are to see him leave. As the representative of Mexico and as a colleague in our Conference, he has made major contributions to the cause of the work of the CD. I would also like to extend a welcome to the newly appointed Ambassador of Pakistan, Ambassador Akram. With his rich experience in the field of multilateral diplomacy and on the basis of the outstanding work done by his able predecessor Ambassador Kamal, he will certainly contribute new achievements to the work of the CD.

Upon the instructions of the Chinese Government, I hereby deliver the national statement of China on the provision of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, which was made yesterday in Beijing by the spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. The full text is as follows:

> "For the purpose of enhancing international peace, security and stability and facilitating the realization of the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, China hereby declares its position on security assurances as follows:
>
> "1. China undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances.
>
> "2. China undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances. This commitment naturally applies to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or non-nuclear-weapon States that have undertaken any comparable internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices.
>
> "3. China has always held that pending the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances. China strongly calls for the early conclusion of an international convention banning the first use of nuclear weapons as well as an international legal instrument on assuring non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
>
> "4. China, as a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, undertakes to take action within the Council in order that the Council can take appropriate measures to provide, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, necessary assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State that comes under attack with nuclear weapons, and to impose strict and effective sanctions on the attacking State. This commitment naturally applies to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or any non-nuclear-weapon State that has undertaken any comparable international binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices, in the event of aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against the State.
>
> "5. The 'positive security assurance' provided by China, as contained in paragraph 4, does not in any way compromise China's position as contained in paragraph 3 and shall not in any way be construed as endorsing the use of nuclear weapons."

The above statement by the Chinese Government once again reiterated the solemn unconditional undertaking by China not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. The statement also strongly called on all the other nuclear-weapon States to undertake the same security assurances. The "positive security assurances" contained in the statement represent a new obligation undertaken for the first time by China.

Mr. President, I would be grateful if you would arrange for the distribution of the above statement as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

In 10 days' time we shall convene the review and extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As China is a nuclear-weapon State, I now wish to take this opportunity to elaborate on some basic positions on issues related to the NPT.

China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and consistently upholds the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and all other types of weapons of mass destruction. In order to realize this objective and maintain international peace, security and stability, and in response to the aspiration and request of the non-nuclear-weapon States, China joined the NPT on 9 March 1992. As a State party, China has since strictly abided by the Treaty and fulfilled in real earnest the obligations set out in the NPT.

As a nuclear-weapon State, China resolutely supports the three main objectives of the NPT. In the prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation, China pursues the policy of not advocating, encouraging or engaging in nuclear-weapon proliferation and not assisting any State in the development of such weapons, and, proceeding from this policy, has formulated a strict and effective nuclear export control regime of her own. In the field of nuclear disarmament, China stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all types of weapons of mass destruction worldwide, including nuclear weapons. China has made specific proposals in this regard. In the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, China, subject to the international safeguards, has carried out to the best of her abilities equal and mutually beneficial international cooperation with various countries, the developing countries in particular.

It is China's firm belief that pending the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, efforts for the prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation are beneficial to the maintenance of international peace and security. Such efforts are therefore of great significance. At the same time, China also believes that nuclear non-proliferation is not the ultimate objective by itself, but, rather, a necessary measure and step in the process of realizing the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

As a State party to the NPT, China supports a smooth extension of the Treaty. In the meantime, China is of the view that the mere extension of the Treaty is far from sufficient. What is more important is to conclude a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons, like the BWC and CWC, so as to bring about a genuine nuclear-weapon-free world and provide the fundamental assurance for mankind to rid itself of the threat of nuclear war. For this ultimate goal, China stands for the following.

First, all nuclear-weapon-possessing States should declare that they undertake unconditionally not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and that they will negotiate and sign a treaty banning the first use of nuclear weapons as soon as possible. The international community should support the efforts towards the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. All nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. In this respect, the Conference on Disarmament should immediately commence relevant negotiations so as to conclude legally binding international instruments.

Second, the Conference on Disarmament should intensify its negotiations and strive to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996. It should also begin at an early date the negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear-weapon purposes.

Third, all nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. To this end, they are duty-bound to participate in the negotiations on a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons, and to sign and implement such a convention under effective international supervision. In this regard, the major nuclear-weapon States should implement their existing nuclear disarmament treaties to schedule and proceed to further drastic cuts in their respective nuclear arsenals.

Fourth, alongside their efforts for nuclear-weapon non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, all countries should actively promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The above interrelated elements make up an integrated process of nuclear disarmament. China believes that both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States have the right to participate fully in that process. By making their best endeavours in this direction, the nuclear-weapon States will also be fulfilling by actual deeds their obligations provided for in article VI of the NPT.

Since mankind has been able to make nuclear weapons and tap nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the twentieth century, it will certainly be able to comprehensively ban and destroy nuclear weapons and fully harness nuclear energy to enhance its own well-being in the twenty-first century. China wishes to work together with other nuclear-weapon and all non-nuclear-weapon States and make its own contribution for the ultimate realization of this lofty goal.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I should now like to give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Chandra.

Mr. CHANDRA (India): At the outset, since this is the first time I am speaking under your presidency, on behalf of the Indian delegation, I would like to congratulate you on assumption of this important office. My delegation is particularly happy to see you in the Chair because of the very close links between our two countries and because of your qualities of leadership and dynamism. I assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation in all your endeavours. I would also like to avail of this opportunity to thank your predecessor Mrs. Hisami Kurokochi, Ambassador of Japan to the CD, for presiding over this august body in an exemplary manner, and to welcome Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan.

I have asked the floor initially to speak in my capacity as the Coordinator of G-21 on NTB.

The Group of 21 reiterates its earlier call upon all members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States, for the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1995, made in CD/1292.

In this context, the Group of 21 had noted with disappointment the stand taken by some nuclear-weapon States on the fundamental article on "scope" in the rolling text - CD/1273/Rev.1. Their continued support to "exceptions" to nuclear tests has resulted in little progress on this fundamental article. It raises the question about their commitment to the CTBT and goes against the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB. Furthermore, elaborating too vast a verification network also raises serious doubts about the direction and purpose of the present negotiations. It is obvious that the verification of a future CTBT should be determined by the purpose, scope and nature of the treaty.

On the scope of a CTBT, the Group of 21 had made it clear that the CTBT should be for complete cessation of nuclear tests by all States in all environments and for all times. The ban should be comprehensive and no tests should be carried out under any pretext for any reason or justification.

The G-21 is studying the contribution of the international monitoring system (IMS) Expert Group presented in WP.224 and WP.225 as it is a valuable input for the negotiations. The G-21 has also noted the key political and technical issues raised by the Expert Group. The G-21 feels that the vast technical material already prepared by the experts on this subject in the past two years is a sufficient basis for delegations to take political decisions. The Group, therefore, feels that given the slow pace of the negotiations in Working Group 1, there does not appear to be much merit in holding more expert sessions. The experts could be a part of their national delegations. The time has now come to take political decisions in order to achieve progress in textual form in the rolling text.

The Group had made it clear in its earlier working papers that the verification system under the future CTBT should be cost-effective. The cost of the organization's activities including verification should be borne by the States parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the

United Nations and the organization of a CTBT. Like the entire treaty, the verification system should be universal in its application, non-discriminatory in character and guarantee equal access to all States. Therefore, in view of the elaborate IMS system being proposed, the Group does not agree with the emphasis placed by some delegations on their "national technical means" to judge an ambiguous event. Hence, the Group reiterates its earlier position in CD/1266 that the technical secretariat should have the capacity and the responsibility of analysing the data received from the IMS. The organization should be responsible for judgement in this regard. Therefore, the organization of a future CTBT should exchange and analyse all IMS and on-site-inspection (OSI) data with this aim.

It is the Group's hope that the CTBT should be able to attract universal adherence. The entry into force (EIF) should not be complicated to delay the process. Entry into force made contingent upon ratification by the nuclear-weapon States would make the CTBT hostage to them as well as a discriminatory treaty. The expansion of CD membership should also not be utilized as a pretext to delay the entry into force.

In conclusion, the Group is concerned about the slow pace of the negotiations so far. The Group hopes that the pace of negotiations will be accelerated by an exhibition of political will by all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, especially on the "scope", so that a CTBT can be concluded in 1995. I may add that we would need to get back to the Group with the statement of Ambassador Weston of the United Kingdom delivered earlier today on "scope".

I now speak on behalf of my own delegation. I have listened carefully to the statements made today on the security assurances and note the moves for a draft Security Council resolution on security assurances. The issue of effective international arrangements to assure all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is of utmost importance since it is linked to the fundamental security of all States. India has consistently taken the position that the only credible guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lies in the total elimination of such weapons. We, however, recognize that complete nuclear disarmament is a complex issue. Accordingly, pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it is imperative that the nuclear-weapons States provide unconditional security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States irrespective of whether or not they are NPT signatories, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding form i.e. universal and without any qualification or discrimination. It is unfortunate that the new draft resolution of the United Nations Security Council does not meet this objective. Indeed, it appears to be weaker than the earlier United Nations Security Council resolution 255 which required categorical and immediate action by the United Nations Security Council, in case of aggression involving nuclear weapons or threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State, irrespective of whether or not it was a party to the NPT. Moreover, the provisions in the draft resolution relating to the security assurances have been left vague, and are open to interpretation.

Finally, I would be remiss in not availing of this opportunity to place on record our deepest appreciation for the outstanding all-round contribution of Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico to the work of the CD. While he will always be admired for the exemplary manner in which he carried out his duties as the first Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee with a negotiating mandate on NTB, his role extended to all aspects of disarmament and many delegations like mine drew heavily upon his expertise and fund of knowledge. We will miss him and wish him all the very best in his new assignment.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Berdennikov.

Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): First of all, Sir, I should like to congratulate you on taking up the post of President of the Conference on Disarmament. I would also express words of gratitude to the previous President of the CD, Ambassador H. Kurokochi of Japan, for her successful work in the Chair. It also gives me pleasure to welcome Ambassador Akram of Pakistan, who has recently arrived in Geneva, and to wish him success in work in the Conference on Disarmament. I would also like to wish all the best to the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. Marín Bosch, who is soon going to be leaving his post at the Conference on Disarmament, and to thank him for the major contribution he has made to the work of the CD, including the work he did as Chairman of the CTBT Committee in 1994.

I have been instructed to bring to the attention of the Conference on Disarmament the following text of a declaration made by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Bearing in mind the fundamental significance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, respectful of the legitimate desire of States parties to the Treaty which do not possess nuclear weapons to receive assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them, and taking into account the provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, has been instructed to make the following declaration:

> "The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State."

In addition, we should like to emphasize that, as proposed by the President of the Russian Federation at the forty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, efforts have been made to reach agreement on an updated resolution of the United Nations Security Council on security assurances for non-nuclear States. The draft of a resolution on this subject, prepared with the participation of Russian representatives, is being presented to the Security Council for consideration. The thrust of the draft is as follows.

In the event of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the permanent members of the Security Council - the nuclear-weapon States - will immediately bring the matter before the Council and will seek action by the Council to provide the necessary assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to the State that is a victim of an act of, or the object of the threat of, aggression.

Provision is also made for the possibility of taking appropriate measures in response to a request for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance from the victim of aggression, and also compensation from the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained by the State which is the victim of such an act of aggression as a result of the aggression.

We expect that the adoption of a resolution on this subject by the Security Council will be welcomed with satisfaction by the non-nuclear States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and that it will promote the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, international security and world stability.

Mr. President, I would ask you to take steps to have this declaration distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Fasehun.

Mr. FASEHUN (Nigeria): It is a great pleasure for me to address the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) this afternoon. It is also gratifying to see you, the distinguished Ambassador of Kenya, preside over the CD at this historical period in the discussion of non-proliferation issues. Nigeria maintains excellent relations with your country and shares with great Kenya membership of the Organization of African Unity.

I wish also to extend the sincere appreciation of the Nigerian delegation to your predecessors who have steered the work of the CD in the early days of this session. We note in particular the excellent contributions of Her Excellency Ambassador Madam Kurokochi of Japan, who presided over the work of the Conference a few days after her arrival in Geneva.

We take this opportunity to welcome to the CD also the eminent Ambassadors of China, Morocco, Pakistan and Myanmar.

We would like to extend our appreciation to the secretariat of the CD under Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, the Secretary-General of the CD at the head of the United Nations Office in Geneva, to Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Deputy Secretary-General of the CD, and all other staff members of the Centre for Disarmament for their assistance in facilitating our work.

This is a momentous period. We will in a few months be marking the half-century of the existence of the United Nations, the longest surviving global political-security organization. In two weeks also, States parties to the NPT will meet to review and decide on the length of extension of the Treaty. Both anniversaries are, of course, coincidental. But the coincidence offers an opportunity to reflect not only on the quarter-century of non-proliferation efforts but to take a total stock of political-security situations globally.

The world is certainly a less dangerous place. This is due to the end of the cold war and the ideological conflict which spurred that war. But at the regional levels, the world is not any less dangerous than the period of the cold war. Conflicts arising out of the quest to assert old or new identities are the bane of the new world disorder. Old international structures have proved inadequate also to cope with these conflicts. And there is as yet no new structure to solve the problems arising out of the new world disorder.

In the realm of disarmament, there has been slight progress. The world has moved boldly to establish the norm of non-proliferation in the areas of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. The nuclear non-proliferation Treaty is indeed at the core of nuclear non-proliferation. Nigeria supports the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and was, after the Republic of Ireland, the second State globally to ratify the Treaty. Nigeria's nuclear research facilities are under effective safeguards. Adherence to IAEA safeguards reflects our commitment to non-proliferation obligations.

The nuclear non-proliferation Treaty is the third leg in the tripod of global non-proliferation measures, supporting and indeed complementing as it should be biological and chemical weapons. In its 25 years of existence, the NPT has proved useful in restraining horizontal proliferation but less so in containing vertical proliferation. Some of its provisions have been selectively applied. Thus, some States parties, contrary to their commitments, have transferred and/or received technologies for the weaponization of nuclear programmes. Nuclear disarmament measures anticipated in the NPT were for a long time ignored. Whilst welcoming the important steps undertaken in the START I and II process, more and accelerated nuclear disarmament measures are needed. All nuclear-weapon States should reduce significantly their holdings prior to the elimination of such weapons.

When the NPT was negotiated, a few non-proliferation measures were anticipated. Briefly, these were a comprehensive test-ban treaty, fissile material cut-off and security assurances. Twenty-five years later, none of these measures is in place. Except for an African nuclear-weapon-free zone which could be proclaimed by African leaders in Addis Ababa in June 1995, there is no prospect of adding another nuclear-weapon-free zone to the existing ones in Latin America and the Caribbean and the South Pacific soon. Whilst recognizing that discussion had been taking place in the Security Council declaration on security assurances, the latter as well as the former steps appear to be driven by the fever of the NPT review and extension Conference.

We have listened attentively to the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States. We shall study the statements and react accordingly. However, we note in passing that the CD has not been involved in any way in the statements and that further efforts are needed to commence multilateral negotiation of universal and legally binding negative security assurances.

The meeting in New York in two weeks offers the opportunity to critically review the NPT. In reviewing the Treaty, we should identify its strengths and its weaknesses. Our objective should be the strengthening of the Treaty to serve the goal of non-proliferation. As a transition instrument to complete nuclear disarmament, the NPT should be succeeded by a treaty on complete elimination of nuclear weapons. If non-proliferation and complete elimination of biological and chemical weapons is good for humanity, so also is non-proliferation and complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

As indicated in my delegation's statement last session, Nigeria favours a comprehensive test-ban treaty banning further testing of nuclear weapons for all times and in all environments, including underground, under water, in the atmosphere and outer space. We favour no reservation of any kind, and for whatever purpose.

While we agree that the process of negotiation, particularly for a treaty like the CTB, can be very difficult and painstaking, it is our view that we have entered a crucial stage in our negotiation where major political decisions should be taken on such treaty provisions as the international monitoring system, the procedure for on-site inspection (OSI) and the form and location of an appropriate implementing agency, and the verification protocols.

Early agreement on the scope of the treaty is of vital importance to achieving progress in our work. We request all delegations still having problems with this article to withdraw their reservations. The reservations attached to the scope of the treaty send an unwelcome signal. It gives the impression that the test ban will be cosmetic and that it is being negotiated to satisfy the demands of some non-nuclear-weapon States for a test-ban treaty.

While welcoming the appointment of Mr. Peter Marshall as a Friend of the Chair and the other five volunteers on the gathering of relevant data for the preparation of an inventory on radionuclide stations, we are of the view that no expert work should be undertaken until we have taken major political decisions on the outstanding work. We would like to place on record our preference for a cost-effective verification network comprising the four agreed technologies of seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide and infrasound monitoring system, which should be represented through a world-wide but scientifically located IMS and national technical means network with direct linkage to the international data centre. We are of the view that the determination of suspicious or ambiguous events must be based on the data and analysis of the IDC. While inputs from national technical means might be useful in the determination of an ambiguous event, the technical secretariat must have the sole capacity and responsibility to receive and analyse data from the IMS and on-site inspection team. The secretariat should also be able to pronounce its own independent and scientific conclusion to the executive council for final judgement.

The Conference on Disarmament is unique because it is the sole forum for multilateral negotiation of disarmament agreements. The Conference is also special because of the soberness in which debates are conducted and the CD is special because of the demeanour of its participants. The finest of diplomats have passed through this hall and memorialized their presence with known contributions to disarmament and peace. Today, the Conference will be losing one of its finest and most principled participants due to his transfer out of Geneva. Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, a well-known advocate of nuclear disarmament, an apostle of peace and a leader amongst the Group of 21 and the neutral non-nuclear-weapon States, will be sorely missed in this body. We bid him farewell and will always remember his immense contributions as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban under whose tenure negotiations commenced. It would have been our wish to have concluded negotiations while he is still in Geneva.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I see that we have only two and a half minutes to 1 p.m. and yet I still have nine speakers. You may wish to take their names down: Myanmar, who will speak on behalf of the Group of 21, Germany, Cuba, Belgium, Italy, Argentina, Morocco, Mexico and, of course, Mr. Petrovsky. That makes nine. Of course, it is time that I said that perhaps (but I will be in the hands of the Conference) we should consider meeting in the afternoon at 3.30 p.m., and I think that now I can reaffirm that. I am fully aware that there are other meetings which have been planned for 3 o'clock, but this is a unique situation and I place myself entirely in your hands. If you want us to meet at 3 p.m., I am prepared to chair the meeting. I am sure that some of you would like to have a break because you might have some appointments which you cannot cancel now. So do I take it that we can adjourn now until 3.30 p.m., or would you like me to suggest otherwise? I give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): Mr. President, since this is the first time that my delegation takes the floor in the plenary session of the CD this year, I would first of all like to convey to you the pleasure that I and my delegation have in seeing you in the Chair, and as far as I myself am concerned, the pleasure that I see you back after 10 years in such good spirits here in this hall. I hope that I will have another occasion to express my appreciation for the work of your predecessors this year. I will, however, not have an occasion to bid farewell, as I understand it, to Ambassador Marín Bosch, and therefore I would join with others who have expressed appreciation for the work he has done in the context of the CD as well as in other forums to further the cause of disarmament. I would like to wish him and his family well for the future and his future career.

Mr. President, I indeed have only taken the floor today simply to answer your question on the time that we should reconvene this afternoon. As you mentioned yourself, we have a list of nine speakers this afternoon, and - you could call it a selfish reason, but there is also a meeting foreseen this afternoon of Working Group 2 of the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB, where a number of important issues will have to be taken up and, therefore, we are a little bit pressed for time. My suggestion would be that we meet again this afternoon at 3 o'clock and not at 3.30 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much for those observations. I now give the floor to Canada.

Mr. SINCLAIR (Canada): Mr. President, just to agree with our Dutch colleague that in view of some of the other activities to which you have already referred, and which have been planned for this afternoon before we were aware of the length of the speakers' list, would it be possible to begin promptly at 3 o'clock?

The PRESIDENT: I take it then that we have agreed to meet in the afternoon, which means that we can adjourn now and come back to start work at 3 o'clock. I would please request you to be on time so that we can start our work and conclude quickly.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 3.05 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: I now give the floor to the representative of Myanmar, Ambassador Aye, who will speak on behalf of the Group of 21.

Mr. AYE (Myanmar): Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you most warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I pledge our fullest cooperation in the advancement of the work of the CD under your able leadership. I also pay tribute to your predecessor Ambassador Kurokochi of Japan for the excellent work she had done during her tenure of the presidency.

I also welcome to our midst Ambassador Akram of Pakistan, who is no stranger to Geneva and the CD. I am sure we all look forward to working closely with him.

I shall be remiss if I do not also pay tribute to Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico for his substantial and substantive contribution to the work of the CD as well as to that of the Group of 21. Although he is leaving us soon, our memory of the time we spent together with him in the CD will remain with us for a long time to come. We wish him every success in his new post.

I shall now make a statement on behalf of the Group of 21. The statement is as follows:

> "There was emerging consensus on the draft Presidential statement circulated to the members of the CD on 5 April. It reads as follows:
>
> > "'Following the adoption of the report of Ambassador Shannon (CD/1299) at the 703rd plenary meeting on 23 March 1995, the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices was established under agenda item 2 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear

arms race and nuclear disarmament". Consultations held by my predecessor and myself indicate that there is agreement to appoint Ambassador Shannon of Canada as Chairman of the Committee'.

"The Group of 21 has shown flexibility in agreeing to the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. This gesture should be reciprocated by the other country groups.

"The Group of 21 regrets that, despite the flexibility shown by it, the emerging consensus on a draft Presidential statement on the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee was impeded by the inflexible stand of a group of countries. It is the responsibility of that group that progress has not been made on this question.

"The Group of 21 considers that when an ad hoc committee is established, it must be done so under one of the agenda items, and that this Ad Hoc Committee comes under agenda item 2, 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament'.

"This has been mentioned in the Presidential statement in January 1994, in the CD annual report of 1994, and the presidential statement contained in CD/1294 of 3 February 1995.

"The rules of procedure of the CD do not preclude the establishment of more than one ad hoc committee under an agenda item. The Group, therefore, places on record its position that this is without prejudice to its request for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament under agenda item 2, as required.

"The Group also takes the view that a satisfactory solution to the question of the re-establishment of the ad hoc committees on negative security assurances and on prevention of an arms race in outer space, respectively, will have direct bearing on the commencement of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices."

I would also like to take this opportunity to make another statement on security assurances on behalf of the Group of 21. The statement is as follows:

"It has come to the G 21's knowledge that a draft United Nations Security Council resolution on security assurances has been recently circulated in New York. The G 21 has carefully examined the proposals contained in that draft and would like to make the following preliminary observations.

"Neither the Conference on Disarmament, nor any country belonging to the G 21, has been associated with the drafting of the proposal, notwithstanding the fact that the CD is universally recognized as the sole multilateral negotiating disarmament body.

"While taking into consideration the positive aspects of the proposal, the G 21 observes that this resolution does not take into account any of the formal objections made in the past by non-nuclear-weapon States on the restrictive, restrained, uncertain, conditional and discriminatory character of the guarantees already provided.

"The G 21 reiterates its conviction that duly negotiated security assurances are a legitimate right of non-nuclear-weapon States. In this context, it notes with disappointment that the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons has not even been re-established during the present session.

"The Group considers that the terms of its declaration of 31 March 1994, as reported in document CD/1256, remain valid and merit serious consideration. It is imperative that an unconditional multilaterally negotiated and legally binding convention on negative security assurances should be drafted and, to this end, all members of the CD should display their political will.

"In this regard, it is worth recalling the great importance that the heads of State and Government of the non-aligned countries attach to a multilateral and legally binding convention governing this issue, as expressed during their tenth summit in Jakarta, in 1992, and reiterated by the non-aligned Foreign Ministers in Cairo, in May 1994, when they stated that 'security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons could contribute positively to addressing some of the dangers inherent in the presence of nuclear weapons' and 'called upon the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an internationally binding convention'.

"At the same time, the G 21 considers it necessary that the Security Council gives positive assurances to non-nuclear weapon States that should go beyond a mere reiteration of the principles of the United Nations Charter.

"Furthermore, the G 21 reiterates its conviction that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter should not be interpreted as legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons.

"The G 21 is deeply convinced that all aspects relating to nuclear weapons issues are interrelated and that the only effective security guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lies in the total elimination of such weapons. Pending which, it is for the nuclear-weapon States to provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in an internationally and legally binding form."

I request that the statement of the Group of 21 on security assurances be issued as an official document of the CD.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Myanmar for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador Hoffmann.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Thank you, Mr. President. I think the United States would like to speak first.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. President and thanks to my German colleague. I would like to very briefly intervene in my capacity as Western Group Coordinator at the present time, in order to respond to the first of the two statements made by my Myanmar colleague, the one relative to cut-off. It appears as though there is a misunderstanding. I and my Group have listened very carefully to this statement and we are particularly focused on the fact that the statement indicates that the Group of 21 is in favour of the appointment of Ambassador Gerald Shannon to be Coordinator of the cut-off group that was established on the 23rd of last month, and since the G.21 statement mentions that the gesture should be reciprocated and seems to say that there is an inflexible stand on the part of my Group, I would like to ask you, Mr. President, right now if you would ascertain whether it is, as we suspect, the case that a consensus does exist now to appoint Ambassador Shannon as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee that was established under your predecessor's chairmanship on 23 March. If you could do that right now, I think it would be very encouraging.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States for his statement. He has asked the question as to whether there is a consensus to appoint Ambassador Shannon of Canada as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off. Is there any reaction to that? I give the floor to the representative of Myanmar.

Mr. AYE (Myanmar): I regret having to take the floor for the second time, but a question has been posed as to the position of the G.21 regarding the appointment of Ambassador Shannon as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on fissile material "cut-off".

Some ideas have been given to me as the Coordinator of the G.21 yesterday at the Presidential consultations and, of course, I have undertaken to present these new elements to the Group of 21 and my response is based on the meeting we had earlier in the day and on the deliberations we had at the Presidential consultations. If there needs to be any further discussion on this and any stand that we may take on this, I submit that I will have to report this development to the Group of 21 and hopefully come back to you at the next plenary meeting. But that does not preclude anyone from our Group or other Groups from taking the floor on this matter.

The PRESIDENT: I now have the representatives of Pakistan, Morocco and the United States. I hope that the representative of Germany will not mind if I give them the floor. Thank you. The representative of Pakistan has the floor.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): We have a positive attitude in the Group of 21 and I think this is quite evident from the statement that has been made by the distinguished Ambassador of Myanmar. The distinguished Ambassador of the United States has posed a question, or made a proposal, with regard to the appointment of Ambassador Shannon. In the Group of 21, as we are all aware, we had a formulation which was submitted for consideration and consultation of the Group and I think the Ambassador of Myanmar had read out this formulation to the Conference in his statement. This was a text of a possible Presidential draft statement. Do I take it that this would be acceptable to the Conference as a whole? This is the statement which my colleague has read out, and I will read it out again:

> "Following the adoption of the report of Ambassador Shannon (CD/1299) at the 703rd plenary meeting on 23 March 1995, the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices was established under agenda item 2 entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament'. Consultations held by my predecessor and myself indicate that there is agreement to appoint Ambassador Shannon of Canada as Chairman of the Committee".

What I understand is that this is a formulation that is acceptable in the Group of 21 and we hope that this is also acceptable to the rest of the Conference.

Mr. BEJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco) (translated from French): I think that since I arrived I have been advocating a little transparency, and I think that I will try to apply it to myself today, perhaps in order to start a new era in this field. While my delegation really fully associates itself with the statements made by the Ambassador of Myanmar, speaking as Coordinator of the Group of 21, as regards the substance, namely, that the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material should come under item 2 of the agenda of the Conference, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", my delegation nevertheless greatly regrets that this subject was not raised, or at least settled, during the consultations held at the time of the drafting of Ambassador Shannon's report, which was finally adopted and enabled the Committee to be set up. Frankly, we believe that this is a principle which should be observed in all similar circumstances and that the various concerns should be duly voiced at the proper time in order not to thwart the Conference in its work by over-use of procedural devices or the questioning of decisions formally adopted by the Conference. I think such things ought to be said. Finally, I would like to express my delegation's very clear support for the nomination of Ambassador Shannon as Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I remain encouraged because we are not seeking consensus on a statement, but this is a meeting on the record. The procès-verbal of this meeting will record all the views that have been expressed, including the statement that was proposed to put into your mouth, Sir, which has now been read out two times. But we are not agreeing on a statement - we are trying to agree on a Chairman, so I repeat my request that you seek a consensus which apparently exists here today on Ambassador Shannon as Chairman of the Committee that was established by us two weeks ago.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): On the next occasion when my delegation takes the floor this afternoon we shall with all due formality carry out the pleasant duty of repeating our greetings to you, Sir, thanking the Secretary of the Conference and the Deputy Secretary for their good offices and offering Ambassador Marín Bosch our best wishes for the future, while welcoming Ambassador Akram of Pakistan. However, in a somewhat unusual departure from the practice in this Conference, the general debate has, this afternoon, been interrupted to raise a matter which does not fall within the context of the general debate. However, a question has been asked, and that question was answered in an adequate manner both by the Coordinator of the Group of 21, the distinguished Ambassador of Myanmar, and my delegation thanks him for his explanation, and also by the distinguished Ambassador of Morocco and the distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan, and I think that it is quite clear from their three statements that the position of the Group of 21 cannot be taken apart, and it is pointless and irrelevant to the matter before us to insist on attempting to take apart what is the clear position of the Group of 21 with regard to the issue of the terms on which the committee for fissionable material has to be set up and its chairmanship determined. Ambassador Akram of Pakistan read out a text which I could read out for the third time, but I think that this is not necessary, and it is that text which has the full endorsement of the Group of 21. It is not a question of portions of the text, and it is not a question of either the first or the second part or separate and selective aspects of it. It is a question of the proposal which is to be found in that text, and which only a few days ago promised a relatively clear consensus in this Conference. I would therefore ask the remaining distinguished representatives in this forum not to go overboard in their attempts to assail the plenary of the Conference, which are becoming a fairly and perhaps excessively frequent practice, and not to attempt to break up what is the position of the Group of 21. That position is maintained in its entirety on the first page read out by the Coordinator of the Group, the representative of Myanmar, and I would request that there should be no more efforts to try to break up and separate into its individual components that position of the Group of 21. As a last comment, I would venture to repeat the question put by the Ambassador of Pakistan, in other words, I would like to know, Sir, through you, whether at this moment we can actually move to adopt as a formal decision of this Conference the text to be found in the statement by the Group of 21. I hope that delegations will react to this proposal.

Mr. BOYTHA (Hungary): I wish to take the floor on behalf of the Eastern European Group. Our Group has several times discussed the issue of the operation of the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off. We also participated in the discussion held at the Presidential consultations yesterday. We understand that there are diverging views concerning the content of the Presidential statement and we wish to be flexible to this end. However, we were of the view that we should stick to the actual history of the development of this question and we should consider the records and the decisions already taken. So for this Group it seems to be quite clear that the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off has been established by the adoption of the report submitted to the plenary by Ambassador Shannon, the then Special Coordinator for this issue. It has also been decided by the presidency that there remains one question open, and this is the appointment of the Chairman of that Committee. Our Group is unanimous in having Ambassador Shannon appointed as the Chairman.

Our Group was also unanimous that the Ad Hoc Committee has been already established and now the question of the Presidential statement - whether or not, and how, a reference should be made to agenda item 2 - was left open and we were flexible in this regard. The only condition on our part was that we should not go against what has already been placed on record and what has been actually already decided, namely, the setting up of the Ad Hoc Committee, and that there is only one question remaining open, and this is who should be the Chairman. The reference to agenda item 2 seems to be a legitimate request because it has already been put on record when the Special Coordinator was appointed and this was done, as can be seen from the documents relating to the issue, with explicit reference to item 2, and as a consequence there seemed to be no need by the then President of the CD to repeat it again, that the establishment of the Committee is happening under agenda item 2, since all negotiations and consultations conducted to the end of establishing this Committee have been conducted on the basis of a consensus on item 2. So the view of our Group is that we consider the Committee as established, we wish to have Ambassador Shannon as its President and we are flexible as to the wording of any possible Presidential statement.

The PRESIDENT: If I may also say something myself: you know that you have been briefed on the consultations that took place under the President at the Presidential consultations held yesterday and which were very long and very constructive. At that meeting there was a draft statement that the President had circulated to all of you before yesterday's meeting, the aim of which was to sound your views, without applying any pressure, as to whether we could reach a consensus in the Presidential consultations and then come to report to the plenary this morning, as had been decided upon the week before. It was clear that the draft Presidential statement that I had sent out had had the endorsement of one group; the other group really had no problems with it but wanted to make some amendments to see how we could have consensus. After quite a discussion, we tried to have some texts to see whether some consensus could be reached, and in the end the coordinators agreed to take these texts back to their respective groups with a view to finding consensus. As far as I recollect, everybody had agreed that Ambassador Shannon of Canada was the most qualified within the CD to do the job and be Chairman. As of yesterday, and even as of now, I have not heard about any other candidate. So as far as the Chairman in the person of Ambassador Shannon is concerned, he is unchallenged. I think all of us agreed that he is the one we would like to be the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off. The problem is the Presidential statement appointing him; what should the President say that would command consensus of all the delegations and groups here? It is my understanding that that is where the problem lies, and yet I need consensus so that what I say has to have the support of all the members of the Conference on Disarmament, and it appears to me that there isn't consensus because there are two questions that have been asked: Can we now endorse the candidacy of Ambassador Shannon? And can we also endorse the statement that has been made by the G.21 as understanding that this is the Presidential statement that should be read to appoint the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off? I take it that there is no consensus on the language of the Presidential statement to be made to appoint the Chairman - that is where the difference is. There is no difference on the person of the Ambassador and the question is: What is the situation? If there is no consensus then I do not think the President can make a statement. I can only make a statement that has the support of all of you, so I would like to ask you in return - you asked me and I am asking you: One, I take it that all of you agree on the candidature of Ambassador Shannon. Two, there is a statement that has been read out by the G.21 - what is the situation? If you have problems with either of the two questions, I would like to hear them, otherwise if there are no problems it means there is consensus; if there are problems it means there is no consensus, in which case I would encourage you to continue consulting so that we can have a consensus on the language of the Presidential statement that I will have to make to appoint the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off.

I give the floor to the representative of the United States of America.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, thank you for your analysis, which I think is very helpful. As you accurately recall, when we left your office yesterday afternoon we agreed we were going to take back a proposed Presidential statement - which I did - and it was after a discussion, as you have recalled, that pointed out that the version that had been proposed by the Group of 21 contained an historical inaccuracy. That historical inaccuracy persists in the statement read out by the G.21 Coordinator today. The fact is, as the procès-verbal will verify, that on 23 March 1995 it was not stated that the Committee was established under agenda item 2. We do not argue with the fact that Ambassador Shannon was operating under agenda item 2 - in fact, the document cited by the G.21 is proof of that. We do not argue that point at all, we just argue that historically the record will show that we did not state that we were establishing the Committee under agenda item 2, so we have not had an answer to the undertaking by the G.21 Coordinator that he would bring the latest draft which was put out in your name with the assistance of the Deputy Secretary-General yesterday evening. We have not had an answer from the G.21 on that; they have reverted to an earlier draft on which we spent over an hour in your office, Mr. President, pointing out it had an historical inaccuracy in it. So, far from trying to take apart the position of the Group of 21, we are trying to help them overcome an error which was well discussed yesterday. The statement that we all agreed to take back to our groups, I think you have before you. All the elements in proper historical perspective are there. The fact is that Ambassador Shannon undertook consultations under agenda item 2; the next fact is that the Shannon report was adopted; the next fact is, can we now have agreement on Ambassador Shannon as Chairman?

Mr. AYE (Myanmar): My apologies again for taking the floor for the third time. I would like to assure all delegations present here that this morning the draft Presidential statement just referred to by my friend and colleague was definitely circulated, discussed and considered at the G.21 consultations this morning and our joint response is as it stands in the statement that I have made on behalf of the Group of 21.

The PRESIDENT: What you said would mean that the Group of 21, if this is the explanation, after examining the draft that came out and that you referred to the G.21 - the Presidential proposal was not accepted but that instead it went back to the former one. This is the understanding. If that is the case, then unfortunately there seems to be no consensus.

I give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, I am sorry to take the floor as the case is being argued very effectively by our Group Coordinator, but I would just ask you to consider whether you have not, in fact, established that there is consensus and it seems to me that a much simpler Presidential statement than that which has been produced so far would be perfectly adequate, would not endanger anyone's position at all, and would enable us to get on with the serious work of the Conference, and that statement would simply be: there is agreement that Ambassador Shannon of Canada should chair the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices established by the Conference on Disarmament on 23 March 1995. That seems to me to be adequate for all our purposes.

The PRESIDENT: You have now heard the simpler statement. Is there any reaction to that? Cuba has the floor.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): I would re-emphasize that the content of the discussion we are holding in this plenary this afternoon corresponds more to the Presidential consultations which are customarily held among the coordinators of the groups than the content of a formal plenary of this Conference. Now that the matter has been raised, and we are clearly not going to get out of this so easily, let me say two things. The Group of 21 agreed to the appointment of a special coordinator under item 2 of the Conference's agenda because the Group of 21 feels that this item is not merely a non-proliferation item, but is a topic which also inevitably has to be dealt with from the standpoint of disarmament. Including it in item 2 of the agenda of the Conference gave the item this perspective which the Group of 21 demanded for it. I am not going to spell out the reasons for this insistence, because we all know of the reluctance among some delegations to include in the discussion of this item the problem of stocks and the intention to limit the discussion of its scope solely and exclusively to the problem of future production, which from the standpoint of the security of many countries, including my own, fails to resolve the problems which are of concern to us. It has been said here that the task is to assist the Group of 21 to rectify an historical error. If the Committee on cut-off was established without bearing in mind the fact that this is an item which, by decision of everyone here, was dealt with within the context of article 2 of the Conference's agenda, the error does not lie in adopting a decision now through a Presidential statement saying that cut-off belongs to the general context of the total cessation of the arms race. The mistake was committed on 23 March, and that is why it is now necessary to correct not today's mistake but the mistake made on 23 March.

It was not our intention to raise this situation in view of the progress made in deciding to set up the Committee. But if a mistake was made it was not that of using a decision by the President to place this item in the context from which it should never have been removed, because I emphasize once again that the consideration and the designation of the Special Coordinator on fissionable material were based on the premise that he should be designated within the context of item 2 of the agenda of this Conference. Consequently, if an historical mistake was made it is not one that was made today, it was made on the 23rd, the decision taken on the 23rd. And that error has to be corrected. Consequently, for the reasons which I have just set out, it seems to me that to insist on a Presidential statement which ignores the fact that cut-off is a problem of the article under item 2 of the agenda of the Conference is to insist on disregarding a political decision by the Group of 21, and that in our view is not the way to negotiate nor is it the way to achieve results. Consequently I humbly suggest that at this point you should bring an end to this discussion and that consultations should once again be resumed within the appropriate context so that we can continue with the work of this plenary meeting.

The PRESIDENT: I have Mexico and the United Kingdom who have asked for the floor. However, given the fact that there is a request to resume consultations I will give the floor to Mexico and the United Kingdom and then, if there is no consensus, I suggest that you continue consulting and then we shall go back to the statements. Mexico has the floor - the representative of Morocco has the floor on a point of order.

Mr. BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco) (translated from French): I would like to make a very small comment. I do not think that this sort of debate is of no use or that it belongs in small committees, small hidden nooks. I think that this kind of debate is quite necessary and quite useful, and hence this discussion is welcome in this context as well and I would like you not to close the list of speakers after the next two speakers. If we have something to say, I think the debate belongs in this forum and not in the hidden corners of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: On the proposal of Morocco, the floor is now open on the discussion of this, so I would like to give the floor first to Mexico, then to the United Kingdom and any other delegation who may wish to take the floor. I give the floor to Mexico.

Mrs. CARVALHO (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): My delegation is of course very much in agreement with the proposal made by the distinguished delegation of Cuba, to the effect that it would be better to conclude our discussions in this forum. Experience has shown us that it is not the most appropriate forum for achieving a solution, but magnifies divergences to such an extent that it is not the most conducive to success in our negotiations. I asked for the floor, however, Sir, to make a number of comments on the consultations we held with you yesterday in the Presidential consultations.

There has been much talk here about historical inexactitude with respect to the Presidential statement on the organization of work. In fact, my delegation feels that it is rather a play on words, which some may choose to construe in a certain way, because in a forum similar to this one in an informal consultation this matter was fully discussed; I remember the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom referred to the fact that his delegation was indeed in agreement with having this matter addressed under item 2 but simply that his delegation preferred the first part of the name of the agenda, that is to say, cessation of the arms race, though others preferred the second part of the name of the agenda. So that in fact what we are dealing with here is the need to provide a framework for the work of the committee which is to be set up, since we have taken the decision to set it up, but in fact the establishment of a committee is when we have the first meeting with its chairman and its mandate and this is not the case we are handling at this moment.

I would also like to make a clarification. The only proposal by the President there is on this matter is the one which was circulated on 5 April, because while my delegation recalls yesterday's consultations, the second version which was circulated with the language of the Presidential statement was a suggestion by the Deputy Secretary-General, but it is by no means the proposal by the President of the Conference and this is how my delegation sees it. But in any case it is very clear to everybody that it is not possible to establish a committee in this Conference without making reference to an agenda item or, failing that, introducing this Committee's topic as an agenda item, which is not the case with the Committee on cut-off. Lastly, I would like to ask what is the urgency for the Committee to be set up on this point if we haven't the time to meet. So these will be my comments.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): If I may be less eloquent and more direct, may I suggest that we simply add to my earlier suggestion: "and that it should operate under agenda item 2"? No one is challenging this fact at all. The only reason that we have to do it this way rather than say that it was established on 23 March 1995 under agenda item 2 is that, unfortunately, it was not, and that was just bad advice, no doubt, by the Deputy Secretary-General. But that is how things stand. May I offer the statement again? "There is agreement that Ambassador Shannon of Canada should chair the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices established on 23 March 1995, and that it should operate under agenda item 2." "Operate" may not be the most elegant word, and our distinguished Deputy Secretary-General may be able to suggest another, but this would be my proposal.

The PRESIDENT: May I say that the text sent to group coordinators by the Deputy Secretary-General was done on my behalf and therefore I bear full responsibility for everything as President. We are really trying to see how we can reach consensus. Please bear in mind that we must have consensus. I now have Algeria on my list, but everybody who wants the floor will be able to take it. It is important that we remember that we operate by consensus. The distinguished Ambassador of the United Kingdom has made a proposal and he has added the idea of agenda item 2. There have also been some other comments. It is consensus that we are looking for and I would still urge that even if we talk until tomorrow, if there is no consensus then there shall be no Presidential statement. I can only make a statement that commands consensus. So, I will give the floor to Algeria, Egypt and then Hungary. Algeria has the floor.

Mr. MEGHLAOUI (Algeria) (translated from French): I would have taken the floor before the end of this plenary meeting, Mr. President, if only to say how pleased I am at seeing you chairing our work. Nevertheless, the turn the debate has taken is another reason prompting me to take the floor. First of all, I would like to recall what I myself said here on 23 March 1995 at the time of the adoption of Ambassador Shannon's report. I clearly said that Algeria is interested in the question of fissile materials inasmuch as the non-proliferation and disarmament dimensions were covered. My delegation holds to that position and fully agrees with the 21 position as set out just now by the honourable Ambassador of Myanmar. That said, I would like to tell you that my brief experience of this Conference suggests to me that the more we discuss controversial issues in plenary, the more hard and fast our positions become. That is why your suggestion concerning consultations is very wise and I fully support it. I would therefore propose that we return to the general debate and that in the meantime we conduct consultations so that we can possibly come up with a solution before the end of our work this afternoon. The honourable Ambassador of Great Britain has made a proposal. Maybe others also have proposals to make. Let us withdraw into a corner and discuss the matter. Maybe we can come up with a solution before we close. This may be too optimistic, but you have to be optimistic sometimes.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt): I did not have the intention to intervene at this stage as I thought that the list of speakers in the plenary had been exhausted. I was engaged in a telephone conversation with my Minister, who is actually in Paris, so I came a little bit late to join you. I am perplexed concerning the state of our discussions regarding the statement read by the distinguished Ambassador of Myanmar on behalf of the Group of 21. I just wanted to place on record here that my delegation endorses this statement completely. If there is any difficulty whatsoever concerning the item under which the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off will work, I think that there is no misunderstanding also on that item and the statement read by the Ambassador of Myanmar on behalf of the Group of 21. That item is item 2. It cannot be any other item, otherwise we would like to hear which item other than item 2 we should place this Ad Hoc Committee under in order to operate. My delegation would also welcome and will support the idea of appointing Ambassador Gerald Shannon to chair this Ad Hoc Committee and to start its work as soon as feasible. The discussions on the wording of the Presidential statement would be very difficult to make during the plenary, but while you continue with the list of speakers, some of us could go outside to look at the language which would command consensus on this issue and we have the time to do that.

Mr. BOYTHA (Hungary): My delegation has nothing against relating the operation of the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off to agenda item 2, so for us it would be acceptable in whatever form it is acceptable to all of us, but we cannot accept to go against our own decisions and records, so since it has not been adopted with reference to agenda item 2, we think we have to find another way - either the short solution suggested by the United Kingdom or the version which emerged during our Presidential consultations referring to the conduct of Ambassador Shannon's consultations under agenda item 2. But I would like to make one observation. It has been mentioned that we have to correct the mistake, because it was a mistake to adopt the report and establish the Ad Hoc Committee without reference to agenda item 2. As I understand it, in our rules of procedure nothing is linking the establishment of any subsidiary body of the CD to any specific agenda item. So we would not go against the rules of procedure when we refer to agenda item 2 in another way, and not just by saying that it was adopted under agenda item 2, and I think this is a way of finding a compromise because we understand the interests of the distinguished

Group of 21 to relate the operation of this Committee to agenda item 2, but we cannot do that against a decision already taken by the CD, and if we consider this decision as legitimate, we would not go against the rules of procedure because nowhere in the rules is there the requirement of any linkage of any subsidiary body to any specific agenda item.

Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, I have a very brief proposal to make. I would like to request you to take steps to ensure that the proposal made by the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom is put on paper and distributed here in the room. And while this paper is being prepared, we could revert to the statements which are already scheduled, and then take a decision on this document when we have it before us.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you for that constructive proposal, which the President endorses, so I suggest that with the assistance of the distinguished Ambassador of the United Kingdom, we can have that proposal typed and circulated and in the meanwhile we will resume our work as we did before. I think this is agreed, and I now give the floor to the distinguished Ambassador of Germany.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Mr. President, first of all, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency and, as we have seen today, you lead us with your customary wisdom and we are grateful for this. I also would like to specially welcome our new Pakistani colleague, Ambassador Akram, who is really not a newcomer to this field - my direct opposite number for this month - I can assure him he will have a less colourful time here than I had because Miguel Marín Bosch is leaving us and I am grateful for all that Miguel Marín Bosch did to enlighten me in my endeavours here making our time really more fun and we will miss him.

I find that we are making progress in a way that I would describe as "pole pole" (which means slowly) and I really would have liked to go more swiftly, and these procedural debates we are having today show that the CD really could do better. However, we should not underestimate the statements we heard this morning; I think we had good news this morning and, by the way, this shows already how deeply entrenched in our work Ambassador Akram is, because even before he spoke, apparently he was able to give his thoughts to the mind-reading delegates of France and the United Kingdom because even before he read his speech they already answered some of his points, so I think there is basic understanding in the CD that will really bring us forward. On NSA and PSA we have heard very interesting statements this morning and I am grateful to the delegates who gave them to us; I think this will have a positive impact on the deliberations of the CD as well as on the review process in the NPT Conference later this month. We also had welcome news on the CTBT; we welcome the movement in a key issue as indicated by the delegation of the United Kingdom, namely, the withdrawal of the clause on so-called security tests from the scope article. I also think this is something that will bring our deliberations decisively forward. I would also like to welcome the joint NPT declaration that was presented by France this morning, which contains very helpful elements, and we agree with the aim of unlimited and unconditional extension of the NPT.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Germany for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, Mrs. Bauta Solés.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, my Ambassador has already had an opportunity to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and thanking the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General for their efforts in ensuring the smooth functioning of the work of this Conference. On behalf of my Ambassador, I would like to take this opportunity to convey best wishes to His Excellency Ambassador Marín Bosch and his family in the future and to welcome the new Ambassador of Pakistan, Mr. Akram.

I asked for the floor this afternoon to make my country's position clear with respect to the problem of negative security assurances. This consists in, first: these negative security assurances must be unconditional, that is to say they must not be dependent on membership of the non-proliferation Treaty. Like many other third world countries, my country's security interests are not covered or reflected in the non-proliferation Treaty. Secondly, we have always considered that security assurances must be the result of multilateral negotiations, preferably within the Conference on Disarmament, which, as everybody acknowledges, is the sole multilateral negotiating body on this matter. Security assurances for non-nuclear countries must also be comprehensive, that is to say they should not create exceptions or impose restrictions by means of qualifications. Lastly, it is also our position that these negative security assurances should not contain discriminatory elements.

This morning we listened very carefully to the addresses delivered on this subject. My capital is carefully studying the draft Security Council resolution published in New York City on 23 March, and if you will allow me a digression, Sir, this is perhaps the explanation for the statement by the delegation of Pakistan and not the fact that Ambassador Akram is able to read delegations' minds. But digressions apart, I wanted to say that on the appropriate occasion we shall respond formally to the text presented in New York. However, the elements constituting our position, which I listed at the outset, are not to be found in the draft which is circulating, despite the fact that our position is a position shared and reiterated by many countries in the third world. If the present draft resolution had been negotiated in the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances, which this Conference has not been able to re-establish this year, we are sure that the resulting text would have the advantage of being much more representative of the interests of the non-nuclear countries, particularly the interests of those non-nuclear nations which are not protected under the umbrella of the only existing military alliance. As advocates of nuclear disarmament, we note with a degree of concern the way in which the draft resolution presented in New York, to which I have already referred, seems to sanctify the link that exists between the possession of nuclear weapons and permanent membership of the Security Council. For the rest, and as I have said, we shall be returning to this matter at the appropriate time and place. It only remains for us to associate ourselves fully with the statement made by the Coordinator of the Group of 21 this morning on this subject.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): Since my delegation is taking the floor for the first time under your presidency, Sir, I would like to tell you how pleased we are to see you in the Chair. I am sure that under your leadership the state of our work will make great strides forward. The task will not be easy, as we have seen just a few moments ago during the exchanges on cut-off. I would also like to bid a welcome in this forum to the new representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Akram, who certainly came straight to the point.

I am taking the floor today not in order to paint a full picture of the work of the first session of the Conference, but simply to express satisfaction at the way in which the work has proceeded. We believe that the Ad Hoc CTBT Committee, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Dembinski, and the working groups under the chairmanship of Ambassadors Ramaker and Norberg, as well as the Friends of the Chair and special leaders, have done excellent work. If we compare the way things stood at the beginning of the year and the point we have reached now, whether it be in verification or in the legal and institutional field, true progress has been made and we are now going to be producing a revised rolling text which is more than encouraging. Serious obstacles have also been overcome, such as the American reservation providing for a withdrawal clause after 10 years had elapsed. This is a source of pleasure because the reservation cast unwelcome suspicion over our negotiations. In the same vein we note the decision announced today by the British, and endorsed by France, that so-called security tests would be abandoned. We are fully aware that this cannot have been an easy decision to take, so I wish to say publicly how much we appreciate it.

I also wanted to react to the recent statements made on the subject of security assurances. You are aware that Belgium, having chaired the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances last year in this forum, has a special interest in the subject. We have kept a close eye on all these negotiations conducted in Geneva on the fringes of the Ad Hoc Committee, and hence we now pay tribute to the efforts made by the negotiators from the five nuclear Powers. This was certainly not an easy task, but I think that today the commitment they have undertaken constitutes a very important step in the right direction and that we should all welcome it. Not only have they managed to a great extent to harmonize their security assurances, but they are also jointly tabling a draft resolution in the Security Council. Furthermore, as far as substance is concerned, I think we have to emphasize the innovation in the major commitments as regards positive assurances for States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

With good results concerning the CTBT, these commitments in the field of security assurances, to which we must add the statement just made by France on behalf of the four nuclear Powers relating to article VI of the NPT, we have proof that the responsible countries today are really convinced of the need to make progress in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. This augurs very well for the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty review and extension Conference which will begin in New York in a week or so.

Lastly, I would not like to conclude without paying tribute to our colleague Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, who is bowing out today. Over the years we have appreciated not only his professional approach but also his personal qualities. There is no doubt that the Conference will feel the loss. We wholeheartedly wish him and his family every success and happiness in his new position.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Italy, Ambassador Vattani.

Mr. VATTANI (Italy): Signor Presidente, innanzi tutto, mi consenta di esprimerle un augurio affettuoso. Lei è un grande amico dell'Italia e dà prova di saggezza romana in questi dibattiti. (First of all, allow me to convey friendly greetings to you. You are a great friend of Italy and have displayed Roman wisdom in these debates). I would like also to welcome here Ambassador Akram of Pakistan and wish our friend Miguel Marín Bosch success for the future.

I asked for the floor to express the deep satisfaction of my Government for the fact that after long and difficult negotiations the five States to whom the Treaty on non-proliferation recognizes the possession of nuclear weapons have reached an agreement upon a document on security assurances which is now the object of a Security Council resolution. The Italian Government deems of particular importance the fact that for the first time the five nuclear States have promoted a common initiative on this important issue so as to meet the expectations of several countries. We do hope that the process which, on the eve of the NPT review and extension Conference, allowed this first positive outcome, will continue in the future. We believe that the strengthening of security assurances represents a positive contribution to international peace and security for the benefit first of all of those countries which are parties to the NPT and are in compliance with its obligations. We wish to stress the political value of the fact that for the first time both negative and positive security assurances are contained in a single document, thus meeting the request of many members of the international community.

Although it was not possible to harmonize the specific unilateral commitments of the five States as to the non-use of nuclear weapons, we have considered with deep interest the unilateral declarations made public and we consider of high significance the simultaneous announcement of these declarations. We appreciate the new elements contained in the resolution with regard to the assistance to be provided in case of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We also believe that these documents will contribute to the establishment of a positive climate conducive to a decision at the forthcoming conference in New York on the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. The resolution joins in fact the important results registered in the past years in the field of nuclear disarmament whereas START I and START II are the main, although not the unique, evidences. Furthermore, I would like to emphasize the fact that the resolution represents an outcome which is to be added to the encouraging developments we are assisting here in Geneva in the field of prohibition of nuclear tests and I hope for a ban on production of fissile material for military purposes.

(continued in French)

Allow me, in the light of the discussion that has taken place today, on what you might call a historic day, to make a few observations on what has been said regarding developments in our negotiations on a CTBT. I fully share the feelings that have been expressed by the representatives of Germany and Belgium concerning the progress which, during this first part of the Conference, has been made towards drafting a text which is a good text for preventing nuclear tests. I would like to express our great gratitude to the men who have made these achievements possible. First of all the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Dembinski, but also the chairmen of the two working groups, Ambassadors Norberg and Ramaker, and the dynamic Dr. Peter Marshall, and all the experts and other Friends of the Chair who made it possible during these first 10 weeks of the Conference to have a readable rolling text containing the basic elements of the future convention. We are also encouraged by the statements we have heard this morning from Sir Michael Weston, which are of fundamental significance as regards the purposes of the convention, that is, the elimination of this clause that the delegation of Great Britain had advocated, on this security test which has now been set aside; the statements which our friend Ambassador Errera made on the unlimited nature of the CTBT are also extremely encouraging. We hope that thanks to your energy, Sir, it will be possible before the end of the day also to succeed in appointing the Chairman of the cut-off Committee, so that we will truly be able to say that today was a red-letter day.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina.

Mr. BENITEZ (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): I will begin by congratulating you, Sir, on your election to the post of President of this Conference on Disarmament, and wishing you every success in your duties. We would also like to express appreciation for the excellent work done by your predecessors, Ambassador Kurokochi and Ambassador Vattani in particular. We would also like to endorse the cordial words of farewell we have heard this morning for Ambassador Marín Bosch and the words of welcome for the Ambassadors of Pakistan, Morocco and Myanmar.

My Government notes with satisfaction the declaration on security assurances we have heard this morning from the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia. As you will remember, in our earlier statement before the plenary on 25 February last we pointed out the need felt by the non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty to have additional security assurances and that these could be provided by the nuclear-weapon-possessing member States through the Security Council. We believe that such guarantees are consistent with the commitments which the non-nuclear-weapon States have entered into within the context of the non-proliferation Treaty, so that they meet our expectations in this respect. We have observed in the course of today, and I fear we will continue to see, that a number of delegations are not equally satisfied. But we also very much appreciate the significance of those security assurances as political commitments and we are aware of the efforts which were necessary to achieve them. We believe, therefore, that they represent a major step forward for global security and one of practical importance which is encouraging for future progress on other fronts of common interest, particularly at the forthcoming Conference on the non-proliferation Treaty. We also endorse the joint statement on the non-proliferation Treaty made this morning by Ambassador Errera in all its aspects. In a different vein, we wish to express our appreciation for the statements made by the United Kingdom and France when they referred to the scope of the CTBT and their willingness to withdraw the phrase relating to special tests, which of course takes into account the views expressed by various delegations in this matter.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I certainly did not ask for the floor to refer to the various proposals and unilateral statements presented today. My Government will be studying them together with the draft resolution which the five permanent members of the Security Council presented a fortnight ago. I asked for the floor really to express very sincere thanks for the kind and more than generous words which you uttered this morning, Mr. President, at the already distant start of this meeting. I also wish to express my thanks for the kind words expressed by a number of colleagues in the course of this long day.

In a few days I will be leaving the post of Permanent Representative of Mexico in this city and in a few months I will take up new duties. For some this may come as good news. The bad news for them is that I am still going to be accompanying them to New York to attend to the work of the NPT review and extension Conference.

For years now I have gone to the cinema very infrequently. This is because it seems rather pointless to go to watch a movie which a few days later I will have almost completely forgotten. I cannot recall the plot, let alone the names of the actors. However, the movie of the Conference on Disarmament is not one I forget. And I well remember the actors, and perhaps this is due to the fact that I have seen this particular film on three separate occasions.

When I sat down in this chamber for the first time, 25 years ago, our numbers had risen from 18 to 26. There were so few of us that there were two seats at the table for each delegation. And I had the great honour of sitting beside Ambassador Alfonso García Robles and Ambassador Jorge Castañeda. The Conference on Disarmament was presided over jointly by the United States and the then Soviet Union. Those two countries took the decisions on matters of substance and drew up the annual report to the General Assembly. In order to give the rest of us something to do, and perhaps to impart a semblance of democracy to the proceedings, the co-Chairmen allowed us to "chair" the plenaries on Tuesdays and Thursdays. Each delegation took turns to occupy the Chair every 25 plenaries, that is to say every four months. Consequently, within each year we moved around this table several times. However, though we may have moved a great deal physically, when it came to questions of substance we scarcely budged at all. Now we do not move about very much physically - barely one place every four weeks - but I think that we make more progress on the items on our agenda.

As a result of the very welcome changes introduced in 1978, each delegation now occupies the Chair for a month, and therefore more than six years go by before its turn comes round again. When I came to Geneva for the third time, more than five years ago now, Mexico had just served as president. And now I am leaving on the eve of our next term. Close, but no cigar, as they say.

During my first term here, the Group of 21 was the Group of 12 and met without interpretation in room I. At those meetings one could learn a lot, particularly from Mrs. Alva Myrdal, who in 1982 was to share the Nobel Peace Prize with Ambassador García Robles. But there were many other teachers. And now I realize how much they taught me. I also realize how much I have aged, because one of my colleagues in the early 1970s was the father of one of our Egyptian colleagues now.

The movie I watched in Geneva in this chamber between 1971 and 1975 was not very different from the film which ran between 1977 and 1978 or between 1990 and 1995. In all three there were various scenes of collective navel-gazing concerning the future role of the Conference. In 1971 the NPT and the sea-bed Treaty had been concluded and there were many questions concerning what the Conference was going to do. The most important agenda item concerned a joint ban on chemical and biological weapons. But there were some who did not yet wish to ban chemical weapons, and the Conference focused solely on eliminating the latter. Hence the 1972 Convention on bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons.

In 1977 and 1978 we could not decide what to do and there was also a great deal of thinking, particularly concerning what was to be the first special session of the General Assembly devoted exclusively to disarmament. And now, during my third term, we have found ourselves wondering whether there is life for the CD after the chemical weapons Convention. Last year, by embarking on negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, we managed to give a positive answer to that question.

You all know that the CTBT is a subject which is very dear to me. Carlos Fuentes tells an anecdote which reflects well what is going on in connection with this item, but could also apply to other matters on our agenda. Lost in some remote corner of the Mexican countryside, a couple of tourists stop their car to ask a peasant how to reach their destination. The peasant looks up at the midday sun and replies: "If you had set out earlier you'd be there by now".

Let us try to follow that advice. We have an obligation to be honest not merely with ourselves but with our other colleagues, and above all with those outside this chamber. First and foremost we are human beings and as such we must watch out for the welfare of our neighbours even though this may sometimes mean going counter to alleged "national interests". And this brings us to one of the main problems besetting multilateral negotiations here and in other forums: the nation State. We are here, of course, because we represent governments. That is our starting-point, but we must not turn it into an end in itself. We can, or rather we must, try to lay the foundations for progress in our task of disarmament. We are a kind of guild and we must continue to strengthen this feeling, this sense of collegiality.

I have been fortunate enough to represent a country whose foreign policy in general and disarmament policy in particular it is an honour to uphold. In that branch of national affairs, on est bien dans sa peau au Mexique. Our policy in this forum is such that at times we are mistaken for a non-governmental organization. And I feel rather proud about that because I have a great deal of respect and appreciation for many such organizations. They have so much to offer to our debates.

The role of the Conference secretariat is also important, and could and should be expanded. I thank all its members - those with visible roles and those behind the scenes - for the assistance they have given us.

And in conclusion, during my six years in Geneva I have participated in many meetings and specialized agencies based in this city. But I must confess that of the many tracks which are in operation simultaneously here, the Conference on Disarmament track has been by far my favourite.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): Mr. President, may I express the satisfaction of the Romanian delegation at seeing you in the Chair? I would also like to welcome our new colleague, Ambassador Akram of Pakistan, and express our regret that Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico is leaving us.

I would like to make a short statement with respect to the NSA and PSA declarations of China, Great Britain, France, the Russian Federation and the United States of America. We would like, first of all, to pay due tribute for the efforts made by the five nuclear Powers to come to a common agreement on granting major both positive and negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. These guarantees are consistent with the obligations undertaken by the nuclear Powers under the NPT. Romania welcomes this major step in the right direction. We especially appreciate the fact that this agreement of the five nuclear Powers comes just days before the opening of the NPT Conference in New York. This decision, we hope, is a good omen for the success of the Conference in New York in taking smoothly the decision for the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. You are the last speaker and, as promised, we can now turn to the text that has been circulated as requested by the Ambassador of the Russian Federation and prepared by the United Kingdom. I would have a proposal to make. You have studied the text; it was put to you in order to see whether a consensus could be reached. If there is no consensus I shall not entertain discussion of this matter any more. So either you say you have a consensus on this or I would request you to go back and continue consulting. I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for having been able to give us this language as requested by the distinguished Ambassador of the Russian Federation; you have now read it, as it has been on the table for 20 minutes or more, so the question is: is there consensus? If there is no consensus there shall be no discussion of this item any more and I would request you to continue consultations and in the meanwhile we can go on with the business of the work. Silence means what? I give the floor to the representative of Myanmar.

Mr. AYE (Myanmar): I myself have studied this text in detail and I am sure that my colleagues in the Group of 21 have done likewise. Others in other groups have also studied this text and may have some comments to make on it, but as the Coordinator of the Group of 21, I find myself unable to convey to you that the G.21 does have consensus on this. Having said that, however, we have heard various suggestions from you and from the floor. If we agree to adjourn for a while and then come back later in the hope that there will be consensus on this draft or an alternate proposal, then I am all for it. However, I think we stand for a ruling from the Chair, but this does not preclude anyone from the G.21 from taking the floor on this item at this time.

The PRESIDENT: So you are saying that you would see no consensus and you are suggesting that we should adjourn to discuss this? I give the floor to the distinguished Ambassador of Morocco.

Mr. BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco): I think that, if I may interpret what my colleague Ambassador Zahran of Egypt said a few minutes ago, it was that we could adjourn for a few minutes and then return. This means that maybe the Group of 21 should get together to discuss the draft and then come back in, say, 15 or 30 minutes. That is my understanding of what he said; maybe I am wrong, but I am giving my interpretation.

The PRESIDENT: It would appear that there is a request to adjourn for 15 minutes or so, to consider this. If this is the case, I would ask that we accept this on the understanding that in 15 minutes you can come and tell us what you have decided.

The meeting was suspended at 4.50 p.m. and resumed at 5.15 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: I am sure that you have had enough time to consult on the text proposed by the delegation of the United Kingdom, and reports reaching me indicate that there is no consensus, so I would suggest that we spend no more time on this item. I therefore request you to continue consulting and in the meanwhile we can proceed with other business.

I give the floor to the distinguished Ambassador of Morocco.

Mr. BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco): I am sorry to take the floor. I would simply like to register on the record that my delegation on its part would have been very happy to work on this proposal, to amend it or to give you a counter-proposal to try to have this Ad Hoc Committee started, but it seems that some others will not have it that way, so I will leave it at that.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, on behalf of the Western Group, we would like to ask under what time-frame we should continue to consult. Are we talking about continuing to consult to report back to you in early June? Or to continue consulting now in the hope that you could - if we were successful - call a very brief plenary session, perhaps tomorrow morning?

The PRESIDENT: You have heard the proposal. May I be honest with you? Obviously it is the intention of the Conference to meet tomorrow in plenary and - if this can be arranged - I personally would have no problem, but if this is not possible then it would mean that you would have to come back to report to us at the end of May because it is at the end of May that the Conference will reconvene to start the second part of the session. However, if there is consensus - and subject to confirmation that arrangements can be made to meet tomorrow morning in plenary - then, of course, I am in your hands, so this being the case you could continue consulting between now and 10 a.m. tomorrow morning. Should this not be possible, then there will be no other meeting until after the break. So here we have two possibilities.

Mr. AYE (Myanmar): This is just in response to this new element that has been raised just now. I have had some consultations with a few of the delegations in my Group and I think they would find it rather difficult to get a definitive answer by tomorrow.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): As I understand it, a few delegations in the Group of 21 will not address the issue before us until some time six-seven weeks from now, and if that is the case, then on behalf of the Western Group, I would like to express a deep disappointment.

Mr. AYE (Myanmar): Perhaps I have been misunderstood. I would like to clarify that it was just a few delegations to whom I have talked about the possibility of continuing tomorrow. This is to say that I have not consulted each and every one of the Group of 21, and if I do so, perhaps the situation may be different from the reading that we get from our friend and colleague, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): This morning and early this afternoon, the Coordinator of the Group of 21 set down the position of the Group concerning the draft Presidential statement dated 5 April, and my delegation in its national capacity would like to reiterate its support for, to emphasize, the position taken by the Group of 21 through its Coordinator and also to state for the record our deep regret that this proposed text also failed to achieve the necessary consensus.

The PRESIDENT: It seems there is no consensus on this item, so I would request you to continue consulting. I give the floor to the representative of Germany.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Mr. President, I think we are playing procedural games and we should not do this at this juncture. I think that on the substance we all agree around this table. There are two elements to this: one is that we want Ambassador Shannon to head the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off, and everybody agrees; the second element is that the work of the Ad-Hoc Committee comes under agenda item 2, and everybody agrees. So therefore it is a simple question of getting this on a piece of paper in a wording that is agreeable to everybody. I think this should be feasible, and I submit to you that you should ask the groups to get together either this evening or tomorrow morning to discuss this matter, and then, under your leadership, have the group coordinators settle this problem and then a 10-minute plenary during the day tomorrow in order to settle this. I think it is simply ridiculous that we cannot establish a functioning Ad Hoc Committee so that it can start working at the beginning of the next session, and it has also some added value because if Ambassador Shannon knows that he is Chairman of this Committee, he can already do some intermediate work. If he hangs in limbo, he will not go around and consult and prepare his meetings. So I think it is absolutely necessary, and we owe it to ourselves, to establish this Committee during this part of the session, and we should make an all-out effort and time should not hinder us.

The PRESIDENT: I would like to find out whether it would be possible for us to have a meeting tomorrow morning, and then to see if this meeting will be acceptable by consensus.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): I would like to say that the Conference has already adopted a tentative timetable which provides for meetings of two working groups and an Ad Hoc Committee, but whatever your decision, the secretariat will be ready to provide all the necessary services. We are at your disposal.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, I put what I had suggested on a piece of paper at the request of the distinguished Ambassador of the Russian Federation, and I think that was probably a mistake, because I don't think we need a piece of paper. Surely, with all due respect, you need to ask us two questions. The first is: is there agreement that Ambassador Shannon should chair this Ad Hoc Committee? The second is: is there agreement that it should be under agenda item 2? If the answer to both those questions is "yes" - and I can't for the life of me believe that anyone does not agree with both those propositions - then we are home and dry and we can all go and get on with something more useful.

The PRESIDENT: I have actually asked those questions, and I think I have received a clear answer to the first question: the problem seems to be with the second question. This is what we are trying to find out. I give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): I just wanted to support those who have suggested that tomorrow morning first thing, that is, at 10 o'clock, we have another plenary meeting of the Conference, and it would seem to me that we could then use the time between now and 10 o'clock tomorrow morning to see whether we can find a solution. I appreciate the problem my neighbour to my right has that he cannot, in time, have a collective Group position, but I don't think that is needed because we have here a number of delegations who are particularly concerned with this, and I suppose that on the basis of the text which has now been circulated, they should be able to find an agreement on something that - as was suggested - we basically agree. We basically agree who is going to be the Chairman, and we basically agree that this Ad Hoc Committee has to start its work, and I hope that everybody agrees that it will start its work soon and that it is not being linked to other considerations, but I would hope that that is not the case and that, therefore, it should be possible to make such a decision fairly soon. Therefore, I support what previous speakers have said, that tomorrow we hold a plenary meeting and that in the meantime those most concerned find a solution to this, and I think we are only inches away from an agreement.

The PRESIDENT: I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Cuba - but in your statement, could you please also indicate whether you would be agreeable to having a meeting tomorrow morning, which would mean that between now and tomorrow morning you would consult? Could you address this matter, Madam?

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): When you suspended this plenary to give time for consultations by the Group of 21, you made a ruling, and it was in the light of that ruling that the consultations by the Group of 21 took place. When you made your ruling there was not a single delegation that challenged the ruling you made, that is to say that you would permit time for consultations and if, as a result of those consultations, there was no consensus on the matter, you would not reopen the debate on the item in this plenary. I would ask you, Sir, what is the status of the ruling you made, which was not challenged by anyone, because we are now considering the possibility of meeting again tomorrow. Because, I repeat, the consultations we held were based on the ruling which you made and which was accepted by everyone. Therefore there is a contradiction between your ruling, the acceptance by the Conference and the proposal which is now before us.

The PRESIDENT: Do you realize, the distinguished representative of Cuba, that I may make some rulings but if there is a delegation interested in taking the floor, I cannot prevent that delegation from speaking? Yes, that was my ruling and I would have liked, since there was no consensus, that nobody took the floor. Delegations asked for the floor and I had to give them the floor, unless you want me to rule not to give the floor to anybody else.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Mr. President, I would like to support what you just said, and we are not discussing substance now. We are just discussing the question of how we can come to a decision in an orderly fashion, and I recognize that the Group of 21 has not taken the opportunity to meet during the break but had consultations which were not sufficient to establish a Group view. Therefore, I think we owe it to the Group of 21 to give them the time to come to a Group view and, hopefully, with this Group view, to come, in consultation with the other groups and probably under your leadership, to a joint decision. So I really would propose to give delegations the time to meet tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock for Group consultations, then probably at 10 o'clock you could meet with the group coordinators, then at 11 o'clock we could see whether we need more Group consultations and at 12 o'clock we could have a plenary. This would distract us from some of our other work, but I think it would be worthwhile.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): Just to say that I agree with the time schedule except that we also have the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and prior to that we have to do a few other things, so I think we should maybe squeeze it a little bit, but nevertheless I support this approach.

The PRESIDENT: I take it that the proposal by Germany is acceptable to the Conference.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Mexico - I am sorry I did not see you. You have the floor.

Mrs. CARVALHO (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I didn't understand what you decided because you didn't give us time to think about what was proposed by the distinguished representative of Germany. But in any case I don't understand. What is the hurry? - could somebody explain to me why the United States is in a hurry, why Germany is in a hurry, why the countries which have spoken are in a hurry? I don't understand it. Ambassador Shannon is not here. We haven't time to meet. We have the whole of the next meeting to do it. Why the rush to take time away from other activities scheduled for tomorrow? We are preparing for a very important conference. Let somebody explain this, because frankly I don't get it. I think it is totally unprecedented to be placed in this situation.

The PRESIDENT: I will now rule from the Chair, as follows. I will be in my office tomorrow from 9 o'clock, so between now and tomorrow I would ask you to consult. If you agree that there is a need for a meeting, please contact me as well as the secretariat so that the meeting can be held. If there is no consensus, it means that we will have to consult between now and the second part of the CD session. We cannot go on like this. So please let me know what you want by tomorrow. If I do not hear from anybody, it means that you have not agreed, and I request you to continue discussing this matter. This is the ruling from the Chair. My list of speakers has now been exhausted.

As I mentioned at our plenary meeting last Thursday, I should now like to turn to the recommendation contained in paragraph 11 of document CD/1296 to the effect that the next session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events be held from 7 to 18 August 1995. May I take it that these dates are acceptable to the Conference?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should now like to give the floor to the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, who wishes to make a short statement in connection with the issuance of the Secretary-General's publication entitled The United Nations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): As you just mentioned, Mr. President, I wish to bring to the attention of the Conference the recently issued United Nations publication entitled The United Nations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation. The Secretary-General initiated the project given the utmost importance he attaches to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The publication is part of his Blue Book series, which addresses issues of critical importance to the world community. The fact that the book has been issued just prior to the convening of the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is not coincidental. The Secretary-General believes the upcoming Conference offers the parties to the Treaty a critical opportunity to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and its bulwark NPT treaty, and thereby promote international peace and security. The Secretary-General stresses that:

> "The NPT's importance cannot be overemphasized ... The NPT remains the vital instrument it has always been. For the nuclear non-proliferation regime to remain effective, the Treaty must remain in force."

The Blue Book provides an in-depth look at the NPT, the cornerstone of efforts by the international community to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, while ensuring that the benefits of nuclear technology are available for peaceful purposes.

The Secretary-General also addresses recent progress in nuclear disarmament, stating that "The rapid pace of the present disarmament process is a welcome change from the previous inertia". He cites the INF Treaty, the START I and II treaties and the Lisbon Protocol as examples of such changes.

The Blue Book also contains an extensive and invaluable chronology of important events related to the NPT, as well as the texts of relevant agreements, declarations and resolutions.

Emphasizing the indispensability of the NPT to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Secretary-General writes:

> "The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the nuclear non-proliferation regime continue to serve the international community well. Lack of security, real or perceived, and expanded energy needs are the root cause of concerns about proliferation. This dual challenge of peace and prosperity necessitates an integrated approach to disarmament, collective security and economic and scientific cooperation. States parties to the Treaty that have renounced the intention to develop nuclear weapons consider that they should participate fully in the

> technological, commercial and developmental benefits of nuclear energy. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT or comparable treaties also consider that they should receive satisfactory security assurances from nuclear-weapon States. It is widely agreed that a comprehensive nuclear test ban, one of the highest-priority objectives of the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, should be concluded as soon as possible."
>
> "Efforts that promote means to achieve these ends are worthwhile and should be supported. Threatening to withhold support for a measure that is clearly beneficial in an effort to hasten progress elsewhere is not, I believe, helpful. The NPT is too crucial to be subjected to this type of diplomatic brinkmanship."
>
> "Finally, the NPT does not limit itself to nuclear disarmament. The Treaty's call for 'general and complete disarmament' is an essential provision. The international community has a unique opportunity today to make progress in the regulation of armaments. The United Nations stands ready to help its Member States to fulfil this wish of their people everywhere."

We here at the Conference on Disarmament have an important contribution to make towards cementing further the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Secretary-General emphasized that:

> "Prohibiting tests of nuclear weapons represents a major impediment to their proliferation. Though current technology enables nuclear explosive devices and nuclear weapons to be developed and manufactured without testing, their reliability would be suspect and this would make them less desirable. A comprehensive ban on testing would inhibit the introduction of new weapons and thus curtail sharply the qualitative development of nuclear weapons."

Mr. President, I thank you for allowing me the opportunity to bring to your attention an issue close to the heart of the Secretary-General as many of you prepare to leave for New York. I hope that this contribution of the United Nations Secretariat will prove a useful resource at the review and extension Conference, as well as at our Conference.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr. Petrovsky, for your statement. I am sure I speak for all of us here when I say that we highly appreciate the efforts and the initiative of the Secretary-General to issue this book which is a very important reference material and which could be, as you yourself have said, of use to us, both at the Conference on Disarmament and at the NPT review and extension Conference. I wish to thank the Secretary-General of the United Nations once more for this valuable contribution.

As you are aware, there are still a number of pending issues relating to the Presidential statement covering the agenda and organization of the 1995 session which are still the subject of intensive consultations. It was my hope that I might have been in a position to report progress on some of these issues. However, it appears that more time is indeed needed. Therefore, I intend to actively pursue my consultations during the inter-sessional period in order to allow the Conference to make a smooth and effective start to the second part of its 1995 session. I hope I can rely on all of you to display the necessary degree of flexibility to make this possible.

The secretariat has circulated, at my request, a tentative timetable of meetings planned for the first week of the second part of the session, to be held from 29 May to 2 June 1995. This timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and is, as usual, merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I take it that the timetable is acceptable?

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): To agree, even under the "merely indicative" rubric, that this timetable is acceptable would be, for the Western Group, admission of total failure in our attempt to get work started on the fissile/cut-off issue. It also would mean that, once again, the Western proposal for the immediate re-establishment of the ad hoc committees on negative security assurances, outer space and transparency in armaments is rejected and could not be solved. Now, the Western Group is hoping that we will have a plenary tomorrow and we would like to address the issue of the timetable and maybe even the re-establishment of three ad hoc groups and the energizing, under a new chairmanship, of another ad hoc committee either this afternoon or tomorrow morning.

Mr. BOYTHA (Hungary): I think that since we have at least already established one of the ad hoc committees, i.e. the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off, we should now provide for its work to begin. Therefore, I think we have to reconsider this timetable which also largely depends on the outcome of the consultations you propose, Mr. President, I think we should come back tomorrow to the timetable and see what we can do because now, as I see it, Monday morning and Friday afternoon are free and then perhaps we would have to reshuffle things, but in any case we already have one committee and we are hopeful to be able to establish three more. I think that at this stage it would be premature to accept this and, as you said yourself, this is always subject to certain amendments, but we can already foresee that we would very likely need more time for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off, at least at the beginning.

The PRESIDENT: From the two statements, I think it is clear that there is need for a meeting tomorrow - I think it comes to that. Mexico has the floor.

Mrs. CARVALHO (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): My delegation had refrained from taking the floor out of a sense of discretion. I think there are very many matters on which we can move forward, as was done by the distinguished representative of the United States. The hour is now rather late. All of us in this room are well aware that at this stage it is not possible to achieve agreement. I do not agree with what was said by the distinguished representative of the United States, that there is a total failure on the question of fissile material. Proof of this is that a decision

(Mrs. Carvalho, Mexico)

was taken to establish a committee. That was the objective of the Western Group, to establish a committee, and our Group, even though it had many difficulties, even though the mandate we arrived at for work on this committee is very ambiguous, we were flexible and we agreed that a decision should be taken to establish this committee. That can very well be put on the list of achievements in the field of nuclear disarmament.

At this stage, there is no doubt as to the identity of the person who will fill this post. We have great esteem for, we have a very high opinion of the distinguished Ambassador Shannon, who has shown us the work he is capable of doing. But there is no agreement with respect to form, and this is the truth, because the problem here is not just a question of how to find the words to enable us to appoint Ambassador Shannon - there is a problem of substance which we are not going to resolve in a morning's work. The question of the re-establishment of the three ad hoc committees is a failure because a distinguished Ambassador here took it upon himself to make a link at a certain point, and with that we all went ahead. There is no problem with the re-establishment of the committees on outer space and safety assurances. Nobody has any difficulty at all. There is no problem as regards the need to work on the issue of conventional weapons, no one has any problem, but it wasn't possible to reach agreement on the mandate. On all of these matters, we are not going to be able to resolve anything at all in half a day, and I do not agree that there has been a total failure on any of them. All the positions of each and every one in this Conference are perfectly worthy. It is just the sequence of events which has brought us to this state of affairs. So you have given a ruling, Sir, and I would beseech you to stand by your position and for us to hold consultations in keeping with our practice. Nothing will happen if we have a day not knowing which groups are going to be working at the start of the next session - nothing will happen now, as nothing happened in the past. This is the practice which unfortunately has been followed in this Conference, because failure to resolve matters of substance has led us to focus on questions of form.

The PRESIDENT: From that statement it is clear that the delegation of Mexico is not in favour of having a meeting tomorrow morning. This is what it means. My question was: can we have a meeting tomorrow? - which would mean allowing for the groups and delegations to consult and after consultations, to have a plenary. This is my question. Could you please tell me yes or no to that question for a meeting tomorrow? I want to be guided. I repeat my question, which was whether or not we can have a meeting tomorrow morning which would allow first of all the groups to meet and then later on to have a plenary. Could you let me know what your thinking is on this? I know there are problems; I know we have understood that Ambassador Shannon is the agreed person, but other problems of substance exist, as the delegation of Mexico has said. It is agreed that there is a need for further consultations, but let the President know whether tomorrow group meetings can be held and then a plenary to discuss these matters; if not, please indicate, that is all I am asking. I am aware of the problems, but let me know so that before we leave we know that there will be no meetings tomorrow. I want to know that. Cuba has the floor.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): I don't think it is going to be possible to make any progress if at each step we are going to alter the rules. For the second time this afternoon you made a ruling and once again all of us agreed to it. You said that you would be in your office tomorrow morning and that the coordinators should inform you whether or not there was consensus on a morning meeting, and that is the agreement. I don't understand why we should depart from that ruling which - I re-emphasize - you made and we all accepted. Likewise, I don't understand how it is possible to try to sum up what the distinguished delegate of Mexico has just said by saying that Mexico is opposed to a meeting tomorrow. I think you know, Sir, that we share Mexico's views on this. We have spent three months discussing these matters in this Conference and we are not suddenly going to reach a solution tomorrow morning, because that is how things are. The Mexican delegation asked a very relevant question, which has still not been answered: why must we take a decision within 24 hours on these matters that have been under negotiation for three months now? Why? There is no reason to do so. The Mexican delegation's question has gone unanswered, and for that reason I would suggest that you stand by the ruling you have already made and that you keep yourself available to us all tomorrow in your office and await the outcome of the consultations which the coordinators will convey to you as to whether or not there is consensus that we should meet tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT: That is the ruling, and it is so decided. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? - incidentally, not on what I've ruled. The ruling is this: after these discussions here, there is simply no consensus for a meeting. Therefore, I will be in my office tomorrow morning - and the secretariat will also be available - so that you may get in touch as to whether there will be a meeting. If there is any further discussion on this, I will overrule you. Please, we are not going to talk about this any more as otherwise we will be here until tomorrow. There is going to be no progress on this, so if you are taking the floor in order to come back to this question, I will overrule you.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): Mr. President, after what you have just said, I would hardly dare to come back to this question, but I would only like to say something, if indeed this was the last word on the issue of whether or not we are going to have a plenary tomorrow, because after that I would like to make a practical point with regard to poor Working Group 2, over whose heads all of this has happened this afternoon. But I just wanted to be sure that this was the last word on the question of the plenary meeting tomorrow, as otherwise I shall defer making my point; I am in your hands. If there are no other meetings, then of course I would like to make a point on where Working Group 2 stands with its work. According to the clock, it is one minute to six, so Working Group 2 will not meet this afternoon; it will have to meet tomorrow after the decision with regard to the plenary meeting we are talking about now. With regard to the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, in tomorrow's timetable, first is a meeting of Working Group 1 followed by a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee. I suggest that I get in touch with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to at least reverse the order, so that in the Ad Hoc Committee we can decide that there will be both a Working Group 1 and a Working Group 2 meeting tomorrow, as it is the only solution to the simple fact that we could not find the time this afternoon to have the meeting that was scheduled in my "merely indicative" timetable. My suggestion is that maybe this could be done through you, or through the secretariat, or I could do it myself, that we apprise the Polish delegation - and there is a member of the Polish delegation in the room here - that in our view, tomorrow at 10 o'clock we would start with a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB, which would mean a change in this time schedule for the Chairman, and that there we decide how we are going to divide the remaining time between Working Group 1 and Working Group 2.

The PRESIDENT: Maybe we could also consult with the secretariat on this.

Mr. SINCLAIR (Canada): Mr. President, this has, of course, been a disappointing and frustrating afternoon for the Canadian delegation to sit through, but we will be guided by your ruling. I take the floor simply to say that some days ago we had planned another activity as well for this afternoon and I would like to announce to members of the "Mason group" that we will have a short meeting in room I as soon as the plenary has concluded, and we hope to be able to start in a few minutes.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Speaking in my national capacity, I would ask the Chairman of Working Group 2, through you, Mr. President, whether it is not necessary to have an Ad Hoc Committee meeting at the end of the day, and is he proposing that there be first an Ad Hoc Committee meeting simply to divide up the day and then have one or two working groups meet and then the Ad Hoc Committee at the end of the day? Is this the proposal? If so, could it not be compressed a little in order to reach a decision now that he start off first, Working Group 1 following next and that the Ad Hoc Committee is at the end of the day, so that we can register all progress?

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of the United States for his suggestion. Yes, indeed, there also has to be a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee as such at the end to adopt whatever has been decided in the two working groups. If we could decide here on an order, that would naturally be the most practical way of doing it, and I am all in favour of that. There is a Working Group 1 meeting scheduled for 10 a.m., and I do not know what the delegation of Sweden thinks of it; however, either way it would be fine - start with Working Group 2 at 10 a.m., followed by Working Group 1. At any rate, I do agree with the Ambassador of the United States that we will also have to have a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee at the end.

Mr. LINDGÅRDE (Sweden): I would just like to say that it is fine with the Swedish delegation if the Netherlands and Working Group 2 start at 10 o'clock. It is only very important for Working Group 1 that we get at least one hour tomorrow morning, and if we could have this hour after Working Group 2, that would be fine for us.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Simply to support the proposal which was made by the Ambassador of the United States that we decide here and now that we will meet tomorrow at 10 a.m. starting with Working Group 2, that we will then meet at 11 a.m. with Working Group 1 and following that, if I have understood properly what has just been said by the representative of Sweden, at noon the Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear tests.

The PRESIDENT: It is now clear, and action will be taken accordingly. As I said earlier, I will be available in my office from 9 o'clock onwards so that you may tell me what it is that you have decided. In the event that there is no meeting tomorrow, please indicate how you are going to deal with the question of the timetable of meetings for the first week of the second part of the session. If we do not meet tomorrow, it means that there will be no meetings until after the break. Are there any instructions to be given? How do we handle the second part of the session in the event we do not meet? Let me repeat what I read regarding the tentative timetable: "The secretariat has circulated, at my request, a tentative timetable of meetings planned for the first week of the second part of the session, to be held from 29 May to 2 June 1995. This timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and is, as usual, merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I take it that the timetable is acceptable?" "Tentative" means subject to change. Before we leave, we must know what we are going to do after the break, so I think you need to give some instructions on this. We do not know what will happen tomorrow, but in the event that there is no meeting tomorrow, this will be our last meeting during this first part of the session until after the break, so I think that before we adjourn, we need to know what is going to happen, or at least to give some instructions.

Mr. BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco): Mr. President, I apologize for taking the floor once again, but it seems to me that everybody has understood the implications of not adopting this tentative schedule. So be it. If nobody wants to have the first meeting, maybe we will have it at the resumed session. It is my conviction that we will not have any meeting tomorrow, but everybody understands all of that, so if nobody says anything then you have to draw conclusions.

The PRESIDENT: Would the conclusion be that you adopt this for the first week of the second part of the session?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Having adopted this, it means that the next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, unless we meet tomorrow, will be held on Thursday, 1 June 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.706
1 June 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 1 June 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Miss C.B. Onyoni (Kenya)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 706th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As you may be aware, the head of my delegation is unable to chair this meeting today and, therefore, in accordance with rule 10 of the Conference's rules of procedure, I will be replacing him. I am sure I can count on your cooperation and indulgence.

I should like, first of all, to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, to the newly appointed representatives of Finland, Ambassador Ekblom; of Brazil, Ambassador Lafer; Ambassador Icaza of Mexico; and Ambassador Tarmidzi of Indonesia. I wish to assure them of our full support and cooperation in their new duties.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Finland, Japan, Romania, Argentina, the Islamic Republic of Iran, New Zealand and Belgium. I should now like to give the floor to the representative of Finland, Ambassador Ekblom.

Mr. EKBLOM (Finland): Madam President, thank you for your kind words of welcome.

The CD is starting its second round of this year's session in the aftermath of the review and extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Finland welcomes the historic decision to make the NPT permanent. Despite differences in the political and security perspectives between States parties, the Conference was able to reach a consensus decision. The States parties demonstrated their shared interest in the benefits of the Treaty. The global norm was further strengthened. I would like to pay a special tribute in this connection to South Africa. South Africa's innovative ideas for improving the future implementation of the NPT laid the basis for a consensus decision on indefinite extension.

The fact that the NPT is now permanent has thoroughly changed the normative environment in which nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are pursued. This is a new departure. A need to look forward was underlined by the decisions on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as on the strengthening of the review process for the Treaty. Finland supports these decisions as a framework for future non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

We hope that the new environment in multilateral disarmament will encourage a process of regeneration that makes it more responsive to today's - and tomorrow's - needs. That would create better prospects for the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Much rests upon the CD, as the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. Finland looks forward to rapid progress in a number of areas and is ready to contribute to that end. I would therefore like to take up the following areas that, in our view, deserve immediate attention.

First, review of the agenda and programme of work of the CD. The annual debate about the traditional agenda of the CD should be finally laid to rest.

Instead, the Conference should concentrate, on an annual basis, on operational priorities. This year, the process of establishing ad hoc committees has been far from exemplary. In our view, discussion on this subject should not be prolonged any further. Of the ad hoc committees that have been under discussion, the Committee on Transparency in Armaments is the one that offers new ground for multilateral work. Regrettably, the same cannot be said of the committees dealing with security assurances and outer space. However, new possibilities for a fresh approach could perhaps be found in the discussion of security assurances after the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 - a resolution which we certainly welcome.

We urge the CD to launch the committees now. Above all, we hope that the Committee on the cut-off negotiations could start immediately.

Secondly, review of the procedures of the CD. More efforts should be made to streamline the procedures of the Conference. The value of increased flexibility has become obvious. In this context, I want to raise two specific issues. We believe that all interested States that participate in the work of the Conference, even if not members, should be more effectively involved in the informal work of the Conference, including Presidential consultations and consultations relating to committees as well as - on a case-by-case basis - in group consultations. This would facilitate the participation and the commitment of these countries in the work of the Conference as well as enhance the cooperation between all the participating States in pursuit of global disarmament objectives.

In addition, the practice by which each year several weeks are spent on report-writing should be critically reviewed. In our view, a brief technical report could well replace the existing CD report to the General Assembly. Substantive positions are already reflected in official documents and recorded statements.

Thirdly, review of the composition of the CD. The Conference should finally conclude the endless discussion on the expansion of its membership. Inconclusive talk begins to reflect upon the CD's credibility as a whole. It is simply unacceptable that an objection to one candidate prevents the entry of the rest, including Finland. In our view the Conference could move on this issue by adopting a solution with a qualifying statement to the effect that, for reasons relevant to the maintenance of international peace and security, one new member is subject to international action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Alternatively, the Conference could agree to replace that one country in the proposed list with one or more other candidate countries.

Fourthly, the cut-off negotiations. We hope that the cut-off negotiations will start without further delay. We regard the questions relating to fissile material stockpiles as being of major importance. Nevertheless, calls for inclusion of stockpiles in the negotiations are clearly counterproductive, if the consequence is that the prohibition of production of fissile material for weapons purposes is thereby delayed.

In the context of the cut-off, a much closer relationship needs to be developed with the expertise available in Vienna than is the case with the CTBT negotiations.

Fifthly, the CTBT negotiations. The success of the NPT Conference should facilitate the CTBT negotiations. A clear objective has now been established. The CD should complete the negotiations no later than 1996. This clearly means that the participating States must continue intensive negotiations throughout the second half of 1995. Skipping extensive report-writing is a good idea in this context as well.

Finland urges all the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from test explosions. It was with deep disappointment that we learned of yet another Chinese nuclear explosion, and only days after the nuclear-weapon States, including China, had pledged to exercise utmost restraint in this regard. Continued nuclear testing does not fit anyone's definition of utmost restraint. It certainly does not fit ours.

A universal and internationally and effectively verifiable CTBT is now within reach. Let us all now work together to finally put an end to the era of nuclear-test explosions.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Finland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Kurokochi.

Mrs. KUROKOCHI (Japan): Madam President, at the outset, I should like to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Nanjira, the President of the Conference on Disarmament, and his delegation for the devoted efforts toward good and effective management of the Conference which were amply demonstrated during the previous plenary meetings. I am confident that under your able guidance the Conference will be able to work productively and I assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation to that end.

Today I wish to present brief observations on some disarmament issues, in view, in particular, of the achievements of the NPT review and extension Conference held during our inter-sessional period.

Japan is satisfied that there exists a general will in support of the stabilization and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. As was stated by Mr. Yohei Kono, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, immediately after their adoption, Japan welcomes wholeheartedly the decisions taken without a vote at the NPT Conference; namely, a decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely, as well as decisions on "strengthening the review process for the Treaty" and on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". Minister Kono, who had attended the Conference, had re-emphasized Japan's position to seek the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, based on Japan's experience as a country that suffered the consequences of nuclear bombs, and at the same time, from the stand of clearly renouncing possession of nuclear weapons, had expressed Japan's support for the indefinite extension of the NPT, which played an important role in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Furthermore, he had expressed his hope that as many States parties as possible share this basic view of Japan, which, it may be argued, turned out to be true.

The document "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" lists in paragraph 4 as the important measures in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty (a) the completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the CTBT negotiations no later than 1996, (b) the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off convention, and (c) the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.

With respect to reductions of nuclear weapons, Japan sincerely hopes that all nuclear-weapon States will take it upon themselves to pursue, with determination, systematic efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of their elimination, in response to the trust placed in them by non-nuclear-weapon States.

As for the cut-off negotiations, my delegation fully agrees that the negotiations should be commenced immediately here in the CD and efforts should be made for an early conclusion of the negotiations. In this connection, Japan supports Ambassador Shannon of Canada for the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on this subject.

As is envisaged in the "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", we, the CD collectively, should spare no efforts to have the CTBT negotiations concluded as soon as possible but no later than 1996. The work on a CTBT in this second part has already been started. Japan, for its part, is ready to make all possible efforts to that end.

In this connection, the "Principles and objectives" also state that "pending the entry into force of a CTBT, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint".

It is extremely regrettable that the People's Republic of China conducted another nuclear test on 15 May, in addition to those in June and October last year, immediately after the NPT Conference had decided to extend the Treaty indefinitely and to strengthen the NPT regime, thereby giving a new hope to the international community on steady promotion of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Japan once again strongly urges China not to repeat nuclear testing, and also appeals to other nuclear-weapon States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear tests.

Both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States should endeavour to achieve steady progress on arms control and disarmament, so that the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world may come closer to reality.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for her statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): It is a great pleasure for me to speak before the Conference on Disarmament in the aftermath of the historic decision taken by the NPT review and extension Conference to make the non-proliferation Treaty permanent. This decision, together with that on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the resolution endorsing the Middle East peace process objectives, including the possibility of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, are indeed a valuable outcome and strong foundation for future achievements in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament, an important contribution to the strengthening of international security and stability.

Thus reinforced, the NPT is called to play an improved pivotal role in consolidating nuclear stability, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the disarmament process, as well as in deepening international cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Yet we owe ourselves further, unabated work for ensuring the universality the NPT needs in order to achieve its generally commendable goals.

The decision to extend the NPT indefinitely is a crucial event not only for the non-proliferation regime but also because it opened a new, challenging chapter in the history of arms control and disarmament. It is now high time for us all to redouble efforts aimed at ridding the world of the threat of mass destruction and to build up a more secure international environment.

Under the permanent NPT the Conference on Disarmament is called upon to play an enhanced role in - at the very least - finalizing the comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996, launching substantive and productive negotiations on a cut-off treaty, and deepening the dialogue on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

The first part of this year's session registered encouraging progress in important areas of negotiation on a CTBT. Yet major issues remain to be solved, such as the scope of the treaty and basic obligations, the shape of the international monitoring system, the financing of verification activities, the future CTBT organization.

Romania shares the view that the CTBT must ban all nuclear tests, everywhere and forever. At the same time, it would be unrealistic for the treaty to apply to activities which are not practically verifiable, such as computer simulations and laboratory experiments. What we need is a credible, effective instrument that serves indeed the non-proliferation goals.

The Romanian Government highly appreciates the recent decision taken by the United Kingdom and France to give up the proposal intended to allow test explosions in exceptional circumstances as a major breakthrough in moving towards agreement on the scope article.

We also welcome the progress made so far in the drafting of the treaty articles on the international monitoring system. Such a system, supported by efficient on-site inspections, consultations and clarification procedures, will be able to accurately deter suspect events and possible non-compliance.

Signing the CTB treaty next year is a bold but attainable aim. The accomplishment of this aim requires consistent endeavours by all participating States for preserving and improving the international climate of mutual confidence. We welcome and appreciate the commitment of all the five nuclear-weapon States to embrace a comprehensive test-ban treaty by 1996.

Romania was among those countries who have resolutely been supporting the early starting of negotiations on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. My Government maintains the view that codifying the cessation of the production of weapons-grade materials in a legally binding instrument would reassure the world community that these materials are not being secretly produced or procured. Furthermore, it would help to advance the nuclear disarmament agenda and constrain the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In our view, at this initial stage the cut-off negotiations should focus mainly on the question of treaty scope and effective verification. We should aim at ensuring its non-discriminatory character and universal adherence to it. The Romanian delegation will be pleased to elaborate further on these important topics in the framework of the respective Ad Hoc Committee, which we hope will start working soon.

Turning to another important issue, namely NSA, I would like to reiterate my country's satisfaction at the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 984 on 11 April 1995 and the individual declarations of the five nuclear-weapon Powers on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and assistance in cases of aggression with such arms. We consider this a major achievement which mirrors the ever-growing international spirit of mutual understanding, as a dividend of the post-cold-war era. This encouraging trend must continue and improve qualitatively. The discussions among the P5 and, perhaps, in the broader framework of the Conference on Disarmament should create the necessary conditions for eventually starting negotiation on a legally binding international instrument on the provision of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States - a long-awaited goal in the overall peace and stability process.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Sánchez Arnau.

Mr. SANCHEZ ARNAU (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): We have asked for the floor merely to draw the Conference's attention to document CD/1314, by means of which we have conveyed to this Conference a statement made on the 23rd of this month by the Argentine Government on the nuclear explosion carried out by the People's Republic of China on 15 May last.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Ambassador Armstrong.

Mr. ARMSTRONG (New Zealand): I am taking the floor this morning to report to this Conference the response of the New Zealand Government and people to the underground nuclear-weapon test conducted by China on 15 May at Lop Nor.

The New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs issued a public statement the following day in which he conveyed the sense of extreme shock felt by all New Zealanders at the news of the test. The Minister added that the action should be "strongly condemned" coming as it did immediately after the decision in New York to make the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty permanent.

The New Zealand Government believes that China's failure to declare a moratorium on its nuclear testing programme runs counter to China's responsibility as a major Power and permanent member of the Security Council. There can be no justification for any testing, especially now that China and the other nuclear-weapons States have agreed to a deadline for completion of this Conference's CTBT negotiations no later than 1996.

The strong protest of the New Zealand Government and people has been conveyed directly to the Chinese authorities in both Beijing and Wellington. We urge China to heed the many calls made in relation to this latest test and to announce a permanent moratorium on all nuclear testing pending the conclusion of the CTBT and its entry into force.

Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I wish first to extend my sincere congratulations to Ambassador D.D.C. Don Nanjira for assuming the post of the presidency of this august body. I wish him all success and assure him of the full cooperation of my delegation. I would also thank Ambassador Vattani of Italy and Ambassador Kurokochi of Japan, the outgoing President of the Conference who guided the Conference very efficiently and skilfully during the previous month. I would further express my sincere appreciation to Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as to Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, for their very valuable contribution to the work of the Conference.

The NPT review and extension Conference and hesitation about its possible outcome had been a major preoccupation for many States for some time, and lack of consensus on the form of the future life of the Treaty had cast a shadow on disarmament negotiations in various areas.

We were faced with a divided camp. A group including some of the nuclear-weapon States argued that the NPT is the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and a limited life-span would weaken the resolve to pursue nuclear disarmament. Others had major concern about the selective implementation of the NPT and considered it very difficult to agree on its unconditional and unlimited extension under those circumstances.

This wide and seemingly unbridgeable gap was eventually closed through a renewal of commitments on principles and actions originated from the Treaty and increased accountability through strengthening the review mechanism in exchange for avoiding a vote on an indefinite extension.

Those of us who have been in the Conference would agree, I am sure, that the negotiations in New York were arduous, and at times frustrating; at the same time they were serious and business-like. As the result we had, at the end, a Declaration that enjoyed full consensus with no reservation or variations of interpretations. Some, including us, may have desired, of course, the declaration to be more far-reaching, particularly on nuclear disarmament. But we decided to maintain what we all fully shared and agreed to and avoid what could be subject to further contention and controversy.

It was understood, therefore, that all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and those who pursued fervently a permanent treaty, were fully committed to all the principles and actions in the declaration and its faithful implementation. That we should consider a significant achievement. We should also expect that the sense of positiveness that prevailed at the end should now illuminate negotiations in various fields of disarmament.

Here at the Conference on Disarmament we recognize that we have not been off to a good start. The first part of the session has been overwhelmed by disagreement on procedures and organization of work. Despite substantial and devoted efforts of the current and previous Presidents, we were unable to commence or continue negotiations on the issues that we should deal with.

I believe that the commitments in New York should now help the Conference on Disarmament to come to an agreement on its activities for the remainder of the session.

Aside from important agreements on peaceful use, compliance and universality, that relate directly to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, a programme of action was decided at the NPT Conference. That programme includes the conclusion of the CTBT, no later than 1996, immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiations on cut-off and systematic and progressive efforts towards reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. A decision was also made to take further steps to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

On this basis, we must pursue, more vigorously, the negotiations on CTBT in order to conclude the treaty before 1996. This requires that we zero in on basic issues involved such as the scope and the verification system and agree on them during this session.

On cut-off we ought to be able now to move quickly to convene the Ad Hoc Committee in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator under item 2 of our agenda.

On nuclear disarmament we should strive to establish an Ad Hoc Committee. In the case that it does not meet the consensus at this stage, then, as the minimum, a Special Coordinator should be appointed to consult with the members with a view to reaching agreement on the manner in which the determined pursuit and the systematic efforts for nuclear disarmament may be structured.

On negative security assurances the agreement that such assurances could be included in the treaty should now open the way for renewed negotiations at the Ad Hoc Committee leading to a more definite outcome.

It must also be noted that on the important issue of transparency in nuclear armaments, a major point of concern for non-nuclear-weapon States, it was understood that the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA is the most appropriate setting for its consideration. This understanding should now help us in agreeing to reconvene the Ad Hoc Committee with an adjusted mandate that will include this issue.

We believe that the agreement on organization of the work could quickly be complemented by agreement on other matters of procedure including the appointment of the chairmen and setting the timetable of the committees, etc.

The Conference on Disarmament is charged with additional responsibility now in the aftermath of the NPT. Its deliberations, and its failures and successes, would be closely examined, inter alia, at the 1997 NPT review and the upcoming 1997 fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Time is short - we need to act quickly. We need to appear and behave, more than ever before, as a united camp. That, I contend, is the earnest desire and the solid resolve of all of us here.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): Madam President, allow me first of all to tell you how pleased my country is to see Kenya taking up the Chair of this Conference. We are sure that under your authority we will make clear progress. In any event you can be assured of the full cooperation of my delegation.

On the occasion of the resumption of the work of the CD, my Government would like to say how pleased it is at the success of the review and extension Conference for the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty which has just taken place in New York. We believe that above and beyond the decision taken there to extend the Treaty indefinitely - thus securing the foundations of international security in the future - its success is due to the fact that the Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament were also adopted. These are designed to serve as guidelines for all our future principles, the fact that - on the very day after they were adopted by consensus - China proceeded to conduct a new nuclear test is absolutely shocking and indeed provocative, and my Government cannot but deplore this fact, for it runs truly counter to the spirit of our negotiations. At the same time, I would say that paradoxically this event, far from slowing down negotiations on the CTBT, underlines the urgent need for their completion. While regretting the event, let us therefore at the same time draw the lesson from it.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Lafer.

Mr. LAFER (Brazil): Madam President, in its intervention during the 30 April plenary meeting, my delegation had occasion to voice its satisfaction to have a representative of friendly Kenya in the high office of President of the Conference on Disarmament. I am glad to renew these expressions to you today.

I take the floor mainly to thank you for the kind words of welcome you have addressed to me on my assumption of the leadership of the Brazilian delegation to the CD.

Disarmament is a subject I have followed closely and made contributions on both in my academic and in my political life. My dealings with disarmament-related activities at the United Nations have, for instance, included participation in the 1991 Group of Experts that advised then Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar on the potential uses of resources allocated to military activities in favour of civilian efforts to promote the environment.

In 1992, as Minister of External Relations of Brazil, I had the pleasure to initiate, in close coordination with other Latin American nations, the amendment process of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which paved the way for the full participation of my country and others in that Treaty's regime and in effect rendering Latin America the first populated nuclear-weapon-free zone of our planet.

Recent international developments and my own previous experience seem to indicate that I have arrived at a particularly critical juncture for the CD, one that encompasses both great difficulties as well as unique opportunities. Important steps could be taken in a fundamental dimension of peace-building - instrumental pacifism - which involves the control and reduction of armaments as the instruments and technical means of war. I am sure this forum will rise to the challenge. Let me assure you that Brazil is ready to carry on giving its contribution to all efforts towards a world progressively deprived of the means to annihilate human civilization friendship and cooperation with all of its 10 neighbours; and having one of the world's lowest military expenditures in terms of GNP.

Mr. WANG (China) (translated from Chinese): Madam President, I am most pleased to see you presiding over the CD's work. The Chinese delegation would like to assure you of its full cooperation. At the same time, it would also take this opportunity to welcome other new representatives. In view of the contents of the statements made previously on behalf of the Chinese delegation I would like to make the following statement.

The Chinese Government has always exercised utmost restraint on nuclear testing. The number of nuclear tests conducted by China is extremely limited.

On 15 May, China conducted an underground nuclear test. Thereafter, a spokesman from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement, elaborating once again the consistent position of the Chinese Government on the issues of nuclear tests and security assurances.

Here I would like to reiterate that China stands for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and favours an early conclusion of the comprehensive nuclear test ban within that framework. With this objective in mind, China has given its active support to the CD for its negotiations on the CTBT and has actively participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the CTBT with a serious, pragmatic and responsible approach. The international community, including China, has generally expressed the hope that the treaty will be concluded at an early date, but no later than 1996. The Chinese Government has stated on many occasions that upon the entry into force of the CTBT, China will abide by the treaty and stop nuclear testing.

The PRESIDENT: As you are aware, there are still a number of pending issues relating to the Presidential statement covering the agenda and organization of the 1995 session which are still the subject of ongoing consultations. It was my hope that progress could have been achieved on some of these issues during the inter-sessional period, which would have allowed us to make an effective start to the second part of our session. However, it appears that further consultations are needed to overcome remaining difficulties. I therefore urge all delegations to display the necessary degree of flexibility to make this possible.

At my request, the secretariat has circulated a tentative timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. This timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and is, as usual, merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I take it that the timetable is acceptable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 8 June 1995 at 10 a.m.